REANIMATING THE STATES’ SINGLE SUBJECT
JURISPRUDENCE: A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL TEST
Justin W. Evans* & Mark C. Bannister**

I. INTRODUCTION: THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE’S SIGNIFICANCE
AND NEGATION
The constitutions of most U.S. states, forty-one of them, contain a
general single subject rule.1 Indiana’s single subject rule,2 a constitutional
mandate confining all legislative acts to one subject and matters properly
connected therewith, was crafted by the 1850 Constitutional Convention to
prevent logrolling and multi-subject acts.3 (Indiana’s single subject rule is
found in section 19 of the state constitution’s legislative article and will
hereafter be referred to as “section 19” for short.) A previous article, The
Meaning and Purposes of State Constitutional Single Subject Rules: A Survey
of States and the Indiana Example,4 employed numerous historical sources,
including the Convention Debates, to show that the Indiana Constitution’s
framers and ratifiers intended for the judicial enforcement of the single
subject rule. Since that time, however, the rule has seldom enjoyed
enforcement in the courts.5 As it happens, most states have similarly given
little weight to their respective single subject rules.6 This is significant for at
least two reasons. First, the intent of the constitution’s framers and ratifiers
is identified in most states as a primary factor in constitutional interpretation
and implementation.7 As such, the single subject rule’s under-enforcement
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“An act . . . shall be confined to one subject and matters properly connected therewith.” IND. CONST.
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See generally Evans & Bannister, supra note 1.
Id.
See infra Parts II & III.
See infra Part IV.
See, e.g., Embry v. O’Bannon, 798 N.E.2d 157, 160 (Ind. 2003) (quoting City Chapel Evangelical
Free Inc. v. City of South Bend, 744 N.E.2d 443, 447 (Ind. 2001)) (“The intent of the framers of
the Constitution is paramount in determining the meaning of a provision.”).
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(or non-enforcement) represents a major departure from this intent.8 Second,
the rule’s proper enforcement would have a significant, positive impact on
the quality of lawmaking throughout the states.9 Yet few states have
articulated workable frameworks for the analysis of their single subject
questions.10
Whereas our previous work on this topic was directed toward
identifying and articulating the precise intent surrounding the single subject
rule (in Indiana as well as in the other single subject states),11 this Article’s
purpose is two-fold. First, the Article considers and analyzes the doctrines
that today frustrate the consistent judicial enforcement of the single subject
rule. Second, this Article proposes a new single subject framework in
accordance with its intended constitutional role. Indiana is employed here as
the lead example, as it was in our previous work,12 because most other states’
historical records yield little or no direct evidence concerning their framers’
and ratifiers’ intentions for the rule.13 Still, this Article examines the trends
in single subject jurisprudence across the states, and the framework proposed
here would likely align well with most of these jurisdictions.
Part II reviews the evolution of the single subject rule in Indiana’s case
law over time and illustrates how sharply this treatment deviates from what
Indiana’s framers and ratifiers intended. The two major hurdles to the rule’s
enforcement—the “enrolled act rule” and “doctrine of infinite
reasonableness”—are identified and discussed. Part III considers the
jurisprudential foundations of the enrolled act rule and doctrine of infinite
reasonableness and concludes that these roadblocks should be renounced.
Part IV considers the single subject rule’s treatment across the states. Part V
then proposes a new analytical framework for single subject analysis. The
framework is directly grounded in the Indiana framers’ and ratifiers’ intent
and likely would function well across the single subject states. Part VI then
concludes the paper.
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See infra Parts II & III.
Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 1–2).
See infra Part IV.
See generally Evans & Bannister, supra note 1.
See generally id.
See, e.g., Migdal v. State, 747 A.2d 1225, 1228–30 (Md. 2000) (noting that a “perusal of the debates
of the 1851 [Maryland] Constitutional Convention reveals little about the purpose of the provision,”
and discussing this at length).
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II. INDIANA’S SINGLE SUBJECT JURISPRUDENCE OVER TIME:
THE ENROLLED ACT RULE, INFINITE REASONABLENESS, AND
JUDICIAL DISENGAGEMENT
The framers of the Indiana Constitution unambiguously intended that
the courts would enforce the single subject rule,14 but section 19 is couched
in broad language. Broad wording is common in constitutions, as the framers
“could not look down the stream of time and see all the cases wherein it
would be proper for a state government to exert legislative power, specify
them and exclude all others . . . .”15 The framers thus intended that the courts
would develop section 19 jurisprudence over time—within, of course, the
parameters defined by their intent. We have seen how the framers defined
these parameters,16 and we turn now to consider how section 19 has actually
fared in the common law over time.17
A. Defining the Contours of Section 19
1. The Earliest Cases
Indiana’s early courts were uncertain how to develop the state’s single
subject jurisprudence—an ambivalence that would prevail until the Civil
War,18 when the Indiana Supreme Court developed several doctrines to
effectively relieve the courts from the rule’s enforcement. Most cases
throughout the nineteenth century focused on section 19’s title requirement,
oftentimes neglecting the single subject rule altogether.
It appears that the first judicial comment on the single subject
requirement was provided by Judge Samuel Gookins, who authored a dissent
in Beebe v. State.19 The defendant was convicted of violating the Liquor Act
of 1855, and had not paid the resultant fees. Although the Beebe majority
14.
15.
16.
17.

18.

19.

Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 28–29, 34–35).
Madison & Indianapolis R.R. Co. v. Whiteneck, 8 Ind. 217, 227–28 (1856).
See generally Evans & Bannister, supra note 1; see also infra Part V.A. (summarizing these).
In its first iteration (1851–1960), section 19 read as follows:
Every act shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith;
which subject shall be expressed in the title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an
act, which shall not be expressed in the title, such an act shall be void only as to so much
thereof as shall not be expressed in the title.
IND. CONST. art. IV, § 19 (1851). This is the text under which most of the cases discussed in Part
II were decided. Not until 1960 and 1974 was the language altered. The major difference between
the 1851 version and today’s version is that the title requirement is no longer a part of section 19.
Substantively, no changes have been made to the single subject rule.
As late as the 1860s, courts acknowledged that section 19 jurisprudence “seems to be as far from
being settled in its meaning and application as it was in the beginning.” Hingle v. State, 24 Ind. 28,
30 (1865); accord Bright v. McCullough, 27 Ind. 223, 226 (1866) (Section 19 questions “have been
the source of much perplexity, both in the legislature and in the courts.”).
6 Ind. 501 (1855).
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decided the case on unrelated grounds, the defendant had lodged two section
19 claims: first, that the Liquor Act embraced more than one subject; and
second, that the Act’s myriad provisions were not adequately expressed in
the Act’s title. This is significant: for the first time, a litigant had properly
asserted that section 19 contained two discrete requirements.20
Voting to uphold the conviction, Judge Gookins critiqued not only the
defendant’s section 19 claim, but also section 19 itself.21 One aspect of
Gookins’ analysis, however, appears consistent with the framers’ intent.
Gookins took the judicial initiative to characterize the Act’s subject, and he
did so by looking to both the Act’s title and its substantive provisions.22 The
framers intended that the courts would decide section 19 questions
(including, necessarily, whether a given act contains more than one
subject).23 In fulfilling this duty, the courts must look to the body of the act
and not to its title alone.24 On this point, Gookins’ dissent was correct.
The first case resolved on section 19 grounds appears to be Indiana
Central Railroad Co. v. Potts.25 Potts is a landmark case; indeed, it appears
that Potts may represent the closest approximation of the framers’ and
ratifiers’ intent in the decisional law. Township trustees sued the defendant
railroad company for obstructing a highway.26 Unsatisfied in the lower
courts, the company appealed and claimed that the statute under which it had
been fined was in violation of section 19.27 The Act, entitled “an act
providing for the election or appointment of supervisors of highways, and
prescribing certain of their duties, and those of county and township officers
20.

21.
22.

23.
24.

25.
26.
27.

The subject and title requirements were discrete provisions. See Evans & Bannister, supra note 1
(manuscript at 12 n.66). The subject requirement survived the 1974 removal of the title
requirement. One feature not discerned in Beebe was the existence of the two requirements within
the single subject rule: a procedural requirement (that the act in question not have been the product
of logrolling), and a substantive requirement (limiting the substance of the act to one subject). See
id. (manuscript at 33–34) (discussing these dual prongs).
Gookins’ criticisms are considered at length in infra Part II.B.
Beebe, 6 Ind. at 552 (Gookins, J., dissenting) (concluding that the subject of the act was the
suppression of intemperance, and that “[i]f [the act] had no title, the context would show this to be
the subject.”).
Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 28–29, 34–35).
See, e.g., Herman v. Dransfield, 200 N.E. 612, 612-13 (Ind. 1936) (limiting the title requirement to
expressing the general subject of an act, since “[t]he details and means by which it is proposed to
make the law effective in accomplishing its purpose must be looked for, not in the title, but in
the body of the bill.”) (quoting Western Union Tel. Co. v. Braxtan, 74 N.E. 985, 986 (Ind. 1905));
Sarlls v. State, 166 N.E. 270, 275 (Ind. 1929) (evaluating a statute for alleged violation of section
19 by looking to both the act’s title and its body). Other states have made similar findings. See,
e.g., In re Petition for Laying Out Cypress Farms Ditch, 180 A. 536, 538 (Del. Super. Ct. 1935);
Pletz v. Secretary of State, 336 N.W.2d 789, 796 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); State Bd. of Health v.
Chippenham Hosp., 245 S.E.2d 430, 434 (Va. 1978). See also Evans & Bannister, supra note 1
(manuscript at 12 n.66) (noting that Indiana’s title and single subject requirements were intended to
serve distinctive purposes).
7 Ind. 681 (1856).
Id. at 682.
Id.
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in relation thereto,” declared that if any person or company obstructed a
highway, they were to be fined five dollars per offense.28
Judge Samuel Perkins, the majority author, first recognized that the
analysis and resolution of section 19 disputes comprise a judicial function—
“we consider [section 19] as much a matter of judicial cognizance as any
other provision in [the 1851 Constitution]”29—and prophetically noted that
“[t]he necessity for [section 19’s] observance increases with each successive
session of the legislature.”30 Section 19’s requirements are enforceable, and
it is a judicial duty to test acts of the legislature against the rule when a
claimed violation is properly raised.31 Further, section 19 ought not be
viewed as a self-enforcing provision:
It [section 19] assumes that the law-making power will, in the short time
allowed for the discharge of much business, improperly confound matters
under a given title, and it charges the Courts, who act deliberately, and
generally upon much discussion by counsel, with the duty of weeding out
and classifying sections, aiding, in short, in establishing proper rules for
distributing subjects in legislation.32

28.
29.
30.

31.

32.

Id.
Id. at 683.
Id. Other states have more recently recognized that the need for the rule’s enforcement has grown
with time, and have linked this growing need to the courts’ lackadaisical enforcement (or outright
deference). See, e.g., Minn. Constitution Assoc. Builders & Contrs. v. Carlson, 590 N.W.2d 130,
135 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999); Nova Health Sys. v. Edmondson, 233 P.3d 380 (Okla. 2010) (noting
that the Oklahoma legislature had ignored both the single subject rule and the Supreme Court’s
prior opinions invalidating acts in violation thereof).
See Potts, 7 Ind. at 683–84; see also Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 31 n.180)
(noting that, in contrast to another constitutional provision, the language of section 19 is not merely
aspirational but is instead mandatory and judicially enforceable).
Potts, 7 Ind. at 684; see also Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 28–29, 34–35)
(illustrating the universal expectation of judicial enforcement among both supporters and opponents
at the Convention). Some states, such as Kansas, have effectively held to the contrary. See, e.g.,
State ex rel. Stephan v. Thiessen, 612 P.2d 172, 178 (Kan. 1980). There, the court found that “the
title of an act may be as broad and comprehensive as the legislature may choose to make it; or it
may be as narrow and restricted as the legislature may choose to make it.” Id. Indeed, the Kansas
Legislature may even include multiple subjects in the same act, “provided all [such subjects] can
be so united and combined as to form only one single, entire, but more extended subject.” Id. at
178–79. This represents the zenith of the single subject states’ methodologies for defining an act’s
subject. It thus appears that in Kansas, the courts will define the subject as broadly as is necessary
to defer to the legislature. Although this may be a function of the Kansas provision’s unique
directive (which mandates that “[t]he provisions of this section shall be liberally construed to
effectuate the acts of the legislature,” KAN. CONST. art. II, § 16; accord Stueve v. Am. Honda
Motors Co., 448 F. Supp. 167, 170 (D. Kan. 1978) (finding that this language was the public’s way
of directing the courts to defer to the legislature)), it is obviously at odds with states whose single
subject provisions do not mandate deference through their plain language. See also Meredith v.
Johnson, 166 S.W.2d 409, 411 (Ky. 1942) (circularly reasoning that “[t]he courts have never held
a title to be insufficient because of general terms, so long as it is inclusive of all the subjects dealt
with in the act”); Yellow Cab Co. v. Neb. State Ry. Comm’n, 120 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Neb. 1963)
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Hence, Potts correctly recognized that the framers had delegated to the
courts the development of the rules for enforcing section 19. Potts then
crafted the first such rule:
And we lay down the proposition . . . that [the] subject must be reasonably
particular and not too general; for otherwise the object of the constitutional
provision would be wholly thwarted. A part of the object of that provision
was that the title should indicate the character of the sections of the act. To
effect this object, the title must be reasonably particular; and, to secure such
particularity, as a general rule, titles should not express ends, objects, or
purposes to be accomplished, but rather means by which ends are to be
accomplished . . . . There are doubtless exceptions, but these are general
propositions.33

Hence, when evaluating single subject disputes, the courts’ characterization
of the subject must be “reasonably particular.” Otherwise, the purpose of
section 19 “would be wholly thwarted.”34
Building on Potts, subsequent pre-Civil War decisions continued to
define the contours of section 19. For example, in a position effectively
annulled by the end of the Civil War, the phrase “matters properly connected
therewith” was not viewed as an invitation to join separate subjects in

33.
34.

(“[i]f an act has but one general object, no matter how broad that object may be, and contains no
matter not germane thereto, and the title fairly expresses the subject of the bill, it does not violate”
the single subject rule); Crawford v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 284 S.W. 892, 893 (Tenn. 1925)
(“The title of an act may be as broad and general as the legislature may prefer, and, if the legislation
under it is germane to the general subject, [the single subject rule] is not violated.”); State ex rel.
Fire Fighters Local 946 v. Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 303 (Wyo. 1968) (“[T]he subject in a bill may
be as comprehensive as the legislature chooses to make it . . . .”); Wash. Cnty. Taxpayers Ass’n v.
Peppel, 604 N.E.2d 181, 188 (Ohio App. Ct. 1992) (“The ‘one subject rule’ of the Ohio Constitution
is merely directory in nature . . . . It is within the discretion of the courts to rely upon the judgment
of the General Assembly as to a bill’s compliance with the Constitution . . . .”). “Ohio is the only
state which holds its one-subject provision to be directory rather than mandatory.” State ex rel. Dix
v. Celeste, 464 N.E.2d 153, 156 (Ohio 1984). Still, as the Dix Court noted,
other states have achieved the laudable aim of judicial non-interference in the legislative
process by holding that their one-subject constitutional provisions should be liberally
construed or that they should be construed so as not to hamper the legislature or to
embarrass honest legislation. It is indeed most noteworthy that while this provision has
been invoked in hundreds of cases in various jurisdictions, “in only a handful of cases
have the courts held an act to embrace more than one subject.”
Id. at 156–57. Ohio bases its position in part on Professor Ruud’s 1958 observation that the single
subject rule addresses “an internal institutional problem, one that could have been left to the
legislative rules to treat.” Id. at 156. This is reminiscent of the arguments made by single subject
opponents at the 1850 Indiana Constitutional Convention. See Evans & Bannister, supra note 1
(manuscript at 28 n.162). Yet as we have seen, although logrolling was an issue that could have
been left to the legislature to address; the fact is that the framers and ratifiers of single subject
constitutions elected not to allocate responsibility for this issue solely to the legislature. See
generally id.
Potts, 7 Ind. at 684.
Id. What the standard of “reasonable particularity” demands is considered in infra Part V.
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derogation of the rule’s plain language. Instead, “the matter must be, in and
of themselves, properly connected with the subject and not such merely as
might with propriety be brought into connection.”35
Additionally, in evaluating section 19 claims, the fundamental inquiry
is whether the given “case [falls] within the evils intended to be guarded
against by section 19 . . . .”36 Having set forth this rule, however, the courts
invited future difficulties in that few of them consulted the historical record
to determine accurately what those evils were. Few opinions appreciated the
dual goals of the subject and title requirements; virtually no opinions
acknowledged the procedural and substantive dimensions of the subject
restriction. Even those cases largely aligned with the framers’ intent were
incorrect in certain respects. Potts, for example, claimed that “another object
of this constitutional provision was to promote codification . . . .”37 While
the subject and title requirements of section 19 might have the beneficial
effects of promoting more clearly written and better-organized statutory law,
there is absolutely no evidence from the Debates that the framers intended
this. By its own terms, section 19 regulates the passage of acts; it does not
speak to the organizational fate of statutes after passage.38
2. The Civil War Era
The Civil War era witnessed the rise of nearly absolute deference to the
General Assembly on single subject questions. For reasons considered
below,39 the Supreme Court adopted rules designed veritably to ensure
section 19’s non-enforcement. In the meantime, additional interpretations of
the provision were generated. One court declared that in section 19, the term
“subject” refers to “the chief thing about which legislation is had,” while the
term “matters” refers to “the things which are secondary, subordinate or

35.
36.
37.
38.

39.

State v. Bowers, 14 Ind. 159, 161 (1860); accord Evans & Bannister, supra note 1, (manuscript at
24 n.140) (matters “properly connected” must be understood as a subset of the act’s subject).
Robinson v. Skipworth, 23 Ind. 311, 317 (1864); accord State v. Closser, 99 N.E. 1057, 1059 (Ind.
1912).
Potts, 7 Ind. at 685.
The only instance in which the single subject rule might impact codification is where the legislature
endeavors to adopt an official codification by the passage of a single act. Indeed, section 19 was
amended in 1960 in an effort to accommodate statutory codifications, precisely because section
19’s original version did not appear to allow for codifications passed as a single act. The General
Assembly created the 1971 Indiana Code in reliance upon the rule’s 1960 iteration (the first official
codification in Indiana’s modern history). Despite the legislature’s good intentions, the Indiana
Supreme Court found the codification to violate the 1960 version of section 19 in State ex rel.
Pearcy v. Criminal Court of Marion Cnty., 274 N.E.2d 519 (Ind. 1971). The Pearcy opinion, in
turn, prompted section 19’s 1974 amendment, which made clear that codifications were exempt
from the single subject requirement. Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 37–40).
See infra Part II.B.
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incidental.”40 During this time, the Court acknowledged that section 19
questions turn largely upon how the court defines or characterizes the act’s
subject.41 Several opinions also held that section 19 is grounded in a test of
“legal connectivity”: namely, the General Assembly may not join two or
more items lacking a “legal connection.”42 Although vague like many rules
of law tendered for the single subject rule’s application, this standard is not
obviously at odds with the framers’ intent. The court also found that in the
event the title itself expressed more than one subject, the judiciary would be
compelled to hold void the entire law, as there would be no basis (apart from
arbitrariness) for deciding which of the subjects expressed in the title would
be upheld and which would not.43 This is significant today because in the
absence of the title requirement, acts found to violate section 19 must be
voided in their entirety, or else upheld in their entirety.44
The Civil War era was characterized by a strenuous ideological
struggle45 with respect to section 19. Very few section 19 decisions offered
any rationales or substantive analyses in justification of their outcomes.46
The rule’s opponents, typically seeking to uphold state powers created by
statute, sought a liberal interpretation of the connection of subjects—contrary
to the intent of the drafters of section 19, whose overriding concern was the
curtailment of legislative powers and discretion.47
3. The Twentieth Century and Today
By the turn of the twentieth century, a consensus effectively had arisen
that the courts would, in practice, simply defer to the legislature on single
subject questions. Thus, the language of the section 19 test was expanded
even further such that “if it appears . . . that all the provisions of the act are
fairly referable to one general subject, and that subject is clearly expressed

40.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

46.

47.

Hingle v. State, 24 Ind. 28, 32 (1865). The meaning of “matters properly connected” is considered
at length in Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 20–25). The meaning of “subject” is
considered in infra Part V.B.
Bright v. McCullough, 27 Ind. 223, 225 (1866).
See, e.g., Grubbs v. State, 24 Ind. 295, 297 (1865).
State ex rel. Pitman v. Tucker, 46 Ind. 355, 360 (1874).
Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 19).
The case of State v. Young, 47 Ind. 150 (1873), is illustrative. There, the majority found that the
1873 Liquor Act violated section 19’s title requirement, discussing the issue without resort to any
rules of law. See id. at 151–53. The dissent was no more grounded in the framers’ intent, using the
undefined standard of “legal connection” and the notion that section 19 is to receive an
interpretation benefitted by “some liberality” so as to uphold the validity of the act. Id. at 174–75
(Buskirk, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Mewherter v. Price, 11 Ind. 165 (1858); Gabbert v. Jeffersonville R.R. Co., 11 Ind. 296
(1858); Coffman v. Keightley, 24 Ind. 509 (1865); Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327 (1874); State v.
Gerhardt, 44 N.E. 469 (Ind. 1896).
See infra Part II.B; see also Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 4–7).
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in the title, the act is valid.”48 While the courts recognized that section 19 “is
explicit, admits of no doubt, and is mandatory”49—statements of principle
that would have pleased the framers—section 19’s mandatory nature was
curtailed in practice nearly to the point of removing it from the Constitution.50
Two significant cases defied the trend of automatic deference
throughout the twentieth century. In Jackson v. State ex rel. South Bend
Motor Bus Co.,51 the court first observed that “because of the wide difference
in the facts involved in each case, there is little of value in the precedents,
except as they announce general principles . . . .”52 Jackson then summarized
the purposes of section 19 as preventing logrolling, preventing surprises upon
legislators, informing citizens of the subjects being acted upon, and
promoting codification.53 The court further noted that the subject of an act
cannot be defined according to the type of legislative authority used to pass
the law.54 The Act in Jackson was found to have violated section 19.55 Years
later, in State ex rel. Pearcy v. Criminal Court of Marion County,56 the court
held void an act concerning both criminal sentences and prison officials.57
More recently, in his 1995 dissent in Pence v. State, Justice Brent
Dickson became the first modern Supreme Court jurist to call for adherence
to the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent.58 Justice Dickson correctly observed that
“[a]bandoning to the legislature essentially free reign to act without heeding
constitutional requirements surely defeats—rather than follows—Indiana’s

48.

49.
50.

51.
52.

53.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Closser, 99 N.E. at 1059 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Closser
further held that with respect to the title requirement, it “is not essential that the general subject of
an act shall be stated in the title in so many words. It is quite permissible to use the details of the
title, where available, to grasp the general subject to which the act relates.” Id.
Powell v. State, 139 N.E. 670, 670 (Ind. 1923).
Powell further explained that “legislative action is presumed to be constitutional and it will be so
declared unless its invalidity is clearly shown” and that “[t]he difficulty in most cases where the
title to a statute is involved is in determining with legal precision the subject of the act, as well as
the matter properly connected with that subject.” Id. at 263.
142 N.E. 423 (Ind. 1924).
Id. at 424. Regrettably, as we have seen, the courts have viewed this as an invitation to simply defer
to legislative action, usually without the benefit of an analysis. The Article endeavors to more
sharply define the “general principles” that ought to guide section 19 analysis in the courts.
As Jackson demonstrates, even those few cases to find section 19 violations were conjectural with
respect to the framers’ intent. Though the dissemination of information to citizens may have been
a beneficial result of section 19’s title requirement, the Debates do not reflect this as a factor in its
approval at the Convention. Indeed, other provisions were included to encourage the legislature’s
and public’s knowledge concerning proposed acts. See Evans & Bannister, supra note 1
(manuscript at 26–27).
Jackson, 142 N.E. at 425.
The Act addressed in Jackson contained multiple provisions concerning motor vehicles, as well as
a provision concerning the inheritance tax. See id. at 423–24.
274 N.E.2d 519 (Ind. 1971).
Id. at 523. Also at issue in Pearcy was the constitutional status of the first Indiana Code. See Evans
& Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 37–40).
652 N.E.2d 486 (Ind. 1995) (Dickson, J., dissenting).
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Distribution of Powers Clause . . . .”59 Section 19, moreover, was included
in the Constitution to prevent logrolling, and Indiana’s voters have twice
reaffirmed their support for the single subject rule through constitutional
ratifications; it follows that the single subject rule should therefore be
enforced.60 Although Justice Dickson has more recently reiterated this
position,61 the Indiana Supreme Court has thus far declined to reexamine its
single subject jurisprudence.62
4. Summary
If the foregoing represented the entire state of Indiana’s single subject
jurisprudence, one might argue that the courts had developed a fair volume
of decisional law in accordance with the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent (even
though very few of these cases assessed that intent on the basis of the
historical record). But the authorities thus far discussed do not represent the
entirety of section 19 jurisprudence. Developing simultaneously to these
rules—in many instances, throughout the same cases as those noted above—
was another set of rules, a line of thought designed to limit, and in some cases
even to eliminate, the single subject rule from Indiana’s constitutional order.
The cases discussed below complete the story of how Indiana’s
contemporary section 19 jurisprudence came to be.
B. Attacks on Section 19: Divergence between the Framers’ Intent and the
Common Law63
1. A Hostile Jurisprudence
Early judicial opponents attacked section 19 directly, questioning the
efficacy of its policy goals.64 These opponents quickly assailed the wisdom
of the rule’s constitutional enshrinement, resuming where section 19’s
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

64.

Id. at 489.
Id.
See A.B. v. State, 949 N.E.2d 1204, 1221-25 (Ind. 2011) (Dickson, J., concurring).
See Loparex, LLC v. MPI Release Tech., 964 N.E.2d 806, 812-15 (Ind. 2012). See also infra Part
III.D.6 (discussing this case).
This section reviews the objections to section 19 over time and addresses the minor objections. See
infra Part III, analyzing the validity of the major hurdles that have arisen to section 19’s
enforcement.
Though this Article’s focus is the single subject rule, several cases also undercut the title
requirement in attacking “section 19.” See, e.g., Robinson v. Skipworth, 23 Ind. 311 (1864) (only
the subject of an act, and not the matters connected therewith, must be expressed in the title); Hines
v. Aydelotte, 29 Ind. 518 (1868) (so long as one could not be “misled” by the title, it is valid); Ule
v. State, 194 N.E. 140 (Ind. 1935) (extremely broad titles are constitutionally permissible); Albert
v. Ind. Milk Control Bd., 200 N.E. 688 (Ind. 1936) (even titles so broad as to permit multiple
matters, which may or may not be properly connected, are permissible).
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Convention opponents had left off. Later critics exhibited more subtlety but
were more effective at curtailing section 19’s enforcement. By the late
1860s, section 19’s stature had been greatly compromised. Supporters of the
single subject rule had prevailed at the Convention. They would not prevail
for very long thereafter.
Section 19’s earliest opponent on the bench was Judge Samuel Gookins
of the Supreme Court. Gookins, a former member of the Indiana House of
Representatives,65 expressed his opposition to section 19 through his dissents
in Beebe v. State (1855)66 and Madison & Indianapolis Railroad Co. v.
Whiteneck (1856).67 In Beebe, Gookins noted that “subjects are almost
infinitely divisible,” and implied that section 19 was therefore
unenforceable.68 Gookins made explicit his opposition to enforcement in
Whiteneck, where he declared that section 19 prompted him to question
“whether any system of laws, adapted to the wants and exigencies of the
people of the State, is practicable under the present [1851] constitution.”69
He further charged that section 19 could potentially implicate a large portion
of the state’s laws.70 Gookins then delivered the decisional law’s most
explicit condemnation of the single subject rule, declaring that the framers
could not have intended for the judicial enforcement of section 19:
Was this what our statesmen were about when making a constitution for us?
If so, no one of them, in debating the subject, (Debates Const. Conv. vol. 2,
p. 1768, et seq.) suggested any thing of the kind; and, if so, then
statesmanship is a different thing from what I had supposed it to be. I can
well enough understand why a system of legislation should require that laws
should operate throughout the State alike; but why that system should
65.

66.
67.
68.

69.
70.

Gookins ran for a seat on the Supreme Court while a member of the Indiana House, losing in 1852,
but ran again and won in 1855. See Indiana Courts, Indiana Supreme Court Website, “Justice
Biographies: Justice Samuel Barnes Gookins,” available at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/
citc/justice-bios/gookins.html. Gookins’ membership in the legislature may explain his willingness
as a jurist to criticize section 19 itself. Gookins’ dissents reveal his belief that the legislature was
not merely paramount in legislation, but exclusive, a position obviously at odds with Indiana’s longstanding recognition of judicial review. His view was also in conflict with the prevailing sentiment
of the time. See generally Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 4–7) (documenting that
the very motivation for the 1851 Constitution was a restraint of the state’s lawmaking authority).
6 Ind. 501 (1855) (Gookins, J., dissenting).
8 Ind. 201 (1856) (Gookins, J., dissenting).
6 Ind. at 503 (Gookins, J., dissenting). This topic is considered at length in Part V, infra. Although
the nature of “a subject” presents certain conceptual challenges, this does not render section 19
unenforceable.
Whiteneck, 8 Ind. at 240 (Gookins, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Id. Gookins neglected two crucial points in this criticism. First, section 19 was intended by the
framers to affect the law; this was the entire point of its inclusion in the new Constitution. Second,
the renewed enforcement of section 19 could be applied exclusively in a prospective manner, so
that past legislatures relying upon the historical decisional law would not see their acts struck on
section 19 grounds. See, e.g., Pence, 652 N.E.2d at 489 (Dickson, J., dissenting). See also infra
Part III.D.2.
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regulate the details of practice, is, I confess, a phase in government-making
quite new to me.71

Gookins, a former legislator himself, was thus intractably opposed to
any constitutional mechanism purporting to regulate the internal mechanics
of the General Assembly. Yet the 1851 Constitution had created just this
type of arrangement. Instead of seeking a repeal of the provision by voters,
however, Gookins urged that the courts simply not enforce section 19. This
was itself a constitutional breach, since it was the framers’ and ratifiers’
prerogative to establish the system of their choosing. Ironically, Gookins and
his ideological successors became judicial activists by insisting upon
inaction from the courts.
Related doctrines rationalizing the non-enforcement of section 19 soon
arose. In the 1865 decision of Hingle, the Court asserted, without
substantiation (and again implying that the framers were wrong to include it
in the Constitution), that section 19 had “become itself a greater curse, we
fear, than had been the vices which it was intended to cure.”72 Section 19’s
non-enforcement was thus rationalized: since the framers are forcing us to
choose between two evils, we are justified in selecting the lesser of the two
by refusing to enforce this provision.73 As if this conclusion was not
sweeping (or decisive) enough, the Hingle Court went a step further by
finding that the phrases “subject” and “matters” were essentially synonyms
and that different phrases were used for the purpose of avoiding

71.

72.

73.

Whiteneck, 8 Ind. at 240 (Gookins, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Gookins’ citation to the
Debates overlooks most of the discussion had on section 19, see Evans & Bannister, supra note 1
(manuscript at 8-30), but numerous other problems hamper Gookins’ position. First, he believed
(erroneously) that section 19 was intended to accomplish codification. See id. (accusing the
majority of finding the statute at issue unconstitutional “because of its particular position in the
statute book”); see also supra note 30. Second, the framers indeed did intend that Section 19 would
be enforced—though not to mandate codification. Rather, section 19 was intended as a check on
the legislative power operating through its procedural and substantive prongs. Evans & Bannister,
supra note 1 (manuscript at 4–14). Finally, voters are at liberty to dictate, through their constitution,
regulations concerning their legislature’s internal workings; and they may further delegate
enforcement of such provisions to the judiciary. In the case of section 19, Indiana’s framers
intended exactly this. Id. (manuscript at 8–30).
Hingle v. State, 24 Ind. 28, 31 (1865). This conclusion may be explained in large measure by the
historical circumstances of the times: the dominant political force of this era favored extremely
strong legislative authority, whereas the 1850 Indiana Convention was called for the purpose of
curtailing legislative abuses. See Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 4–7).
The difficulty with this view is clear: the deliberate non-enforcement of a justiciable constitutional
provision represents an abdication of the courts’ own well-settled duties. As the Court has pointed
out with respect to logrolling (though in the context of another provision), “[w]hether [the
constitution’s] effort to limit logrolling is wise is not the issue. The Constitution makes that call
for us.” City of S. Bend v. Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d 683, 686 n.4 (Ind. 2003). See also infra Part V.B
(noting the misguided perception that this as a binary choice).
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redundancy.74 The result was to morph the rule’s existing phraseology at the
time, “Every act shall embrace but one subject and matters properly
connected therewith; which subject shall be expressed in the title,” into a
phrase in which the two terms were interchangeable: “[E]very act shall
embrace but one subject and [other subjects] properly connected therewith;
[with one of these subjects being] expressed in the title.”75
This reading of section 19 is logically untenable.76 Two additional
conclusions necessarily follow if Hingle is correct. First, the actual meaning
of section 19 must be profoundly different than the import of its plain
language.77 Second, the framers must not really have sought to limit each
legislative act to just one subject, notwithstanding the uniform evidence that
they intended exactly that.78
Though subsequent courts were unwilling to go as far as Hingle had,
they nevertheless found other (equally effective) avenues to the single subject
rule’s non-enforcement. In Bright (1866), for example, the court
acknowledged the Potts standard—requiring that the subject be “reasonably
specific”—but promptly limited Potts in a number of ways.79 Judge
74.

75.
76.
77.

78.
79.

See Hingle, 24 Ind. at 32. Reading these phrases synonymously produces a contradiction. Evans
& Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 24 n.140). Additionally, Hingle’s reading renders the
expression “shall be limited to one subject” meaningless, as the phrase would serve no purpose if
acts in fact need not be confined to only one subject. This is problematic because it has long been
understood that “[t]he words of the Constitution must be presumed to have been carefully chosen
so that each word has a meaning,” Eakin v. State, 474 N.E.2d 62, 65 (Ind. 1985) (emphasis added),
that the “language of each provision of the Constitution must be treated with particular deference,
as though every word had been hammered into place,” Nagy v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp.,
844 N.E.2d 481, 484 (Ind. 2006) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added), and that “the same
words occurring at different places in a constitution will be given the same meaning unless the
context requires a different meaning,” Bayh v. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398, 418 (Ind. 1991). Had
the framers intended these phrases to mean the same thing, they would have used the “subject”
phrase twice—or, more likely, would not have included the provision at all. If acts are not really to
be restricted to one subject, all of section 19’s language is meaningless: under the 1816 Constitution,
no affirmative authorization was necessary to enable an act to cover multiple subjects. See Evans
& Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 24 n.140). Finally, the framers’ intent was clearly that
section 19 would limit every act to a single subject. See id. (manuscript at 12–16). Hingle’s
interpretation can be squared with neither the framer’s intent nor with the plain language of the
Constitution.
See Hingle, 24 Ind. at 32 (illustrating that this was the practical effect of the Court’s judgment).
See supra note 72; see also Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 24 n.140).
This possibility is foreclosed by the long-standing rule that “[i]n examining the language of a
constitution, the courts are not concerned with the wisdom or expediencies
of constitutional provisions, and the duty of the judiciary is merely to carry out the provisions of
the plain language stated in the constitution.” 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 64 (2014).
See Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 7–35).
The Bright Court defined “reasonably specific” as “indicat[ing] some particular branch of
legislation, as a head under which the particular provisions of the act might reasonably be looked
for.” 27 Ind. at 227. This conception, however, invited subjects as broad as the imagination could
conceive, rather than subjects “reasonably particular.” The court posited that in drafting a title, the
legislature might (a) select a title broad enough to cover everything in the act; or (b) enumerate each
detail of the act in its title. However, the court also found that section 19 required only that the
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Gookins’ early dissents were extended through related ideas. Nonenforcement was justified, for example, since “[t]here can be no exact
standard of certainty erected, by which to test the sufficiency of the
expression of the subject.”80 Hence, section 19 would have to be interpreted
with “liberality” in order to prevent the single subject rule from becoming a
greater evil than that which it was designed to prevent.81 This represented
the formalization of a position of nearly absolute judicial deference. Cases
throughout the late 1800s and early 1900s similarly eroded the subject rule
by continuing the themes of questioning the wisdom of its inclusion in the
Constitution,82 construing section 19 with “great liberality,”83 and by
virtually conclusively presuming constitutionality.84
Most of these cases undercut section 19’s substantive prong (the subject
restriction). As previous research has demonstrated, however, the single
subject rule also contains a procedural prong, designed to prevent
logrolling.85 This dimension has also been judicially nullified. The 1869
case of Evans v. Browne established the “enrolled act rule.”86 There, it was
claimed that the act in dispute did not become a law because, before its
passage, forty-two members of the House resigned in order to destroy the
capacity of the House to conduct business by reducing its membership below

80.
81.
82.

83.

84.

85.
86.

subject be expressed in the title. Concluding that a title such as “an act concerning highways” would
be acceptable, id., the court demonstrated that section 19 no longer had any regulatory or
incentivizing effect. The court had recognized the Potts requirement that the subject be “reasonably
specific,” while at the same time noting that the highway title “would constitute a comprehensive
title, under which almost any desired provision relating to highways might be enacted.” Id. A title
this broad is not “reasonably specific”—to be sure, logrolling could still be masked under such a
rubric with ease—but by the mid-1860s, this was the state of the law. See also infra Part V
(discussing the parameters of a reasonableness test in the context of the single subject rule).
Shoemaker v. Smith, 37 Ind. 122, 133 (1871).
Id.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Pitman v. Tucker, 46 Ind. 355, 361–62 (1874) (“It may be doubted whether
[section 19] has accomplished all the good that was anticipated when it was adopted . . . thus almost,
if not entirely, defeating what seems to us the main object of the section.”).
See, e.g., State v. Young, 47 Ind. 150, 151–52 (1873) (whenever there is any doubt, the law will be
sustained); Mull v. Indianapolis & Cincinnati Traction Co., 81 N.E. 657, 659 (Ind. 1907) (“The title
is in all cases given a liberal interpretation, and the largest scope accorded to the words employed
that reason will permit in order to bring within the purview of the title all the provisions of the act.”)
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted); State v. Closser, 99 N.E. 1057, 1059 (Ind. 1912)
(“The title of an act is to receive a liberal construction if necessary to sustain the legislative
intent . . . .”). As we will see, section 19 was construed with such liberality that virtually all
combinations were found to be constitutional. See infra Part III.C. But infinite reasonableness
defeats the purpose of section 19 and is not what the framers intended. See infra Parts III and IV.
See, e.g., Powell v. State, 139 N.E. 670, 670 (Ind. 1923) (“[L]egislative action is presumed to be
constitutional and it will be so declared unless its invalidity is clearly shown.”). In theory, this was
a rebuttable presumption—but experience soon revealed that, with only the most rarified exception,
this was instead a veritable conclusion.
Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 33–34).
30 Ind. 514 (1869).
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sixty-seven, its constitutional quorum.87 The Supreme Court of Indiana held
that so long as an act was authenticated by the presiding officers of each
chamber of the General Assembly, the courts were not at liberty to look to
the journals or other external evidence to test the compliance of an act with
the procedural requirements of article IV. An authenticated act, in other
words, was absolute evidence of the act’s compliance with the Constitution’s
procedural requirements.88 Though Evans was decided with respect to
sections 11 and 25, the enrolled act rule was later applied to all of the
procedural requirements of article IV, including section 19.89 Unlike the
infinite reasonableness standard (which has occasionally been overcome),
the enrolled act rule is conclusive.
Such was the state of section 19 as of the Great Depression, when the
noteworthy case of State v. Steinwedel90 was decided. Building upon
previous thought, Steinwedel observed that the Constitution does not define
the term “subject,” and concluded that there can be no absolute test of general
applicability for single subject questions.91 The only possible test is one of
reasonableness.92 Steinwedel then proposed something new: for section 19
purposes, a “subject” is not to be regarded as “a metaphysical singleness of
idea or thing, but rather . . . some rational unity between the matters embraced
in the act, the unity being found in the general purpose of the act and the
practical problems of efficient administration.”93 Hence,
matters which ordinarily would not be thought to have any common features
or characteristics might for purposes of legislative treatment be grouped
together and treated as one subject. For purposes of legislation, “subjects”
are not absolute existences to be discovered by some sort of a priori
reasoning, but are the result of classification for convenience of treatment
and for greater effectiveness in attaining the general purpose of the
particular legislative act.94

The standard of nearly absolute deference was thus reaffirmed: if “there is
any reasonable basis for the grouping together in one ‘act’ of various matters,
87.
88.
89.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See id. at 515.
See id. at 522–27.
See Jackson v. State ex rel. S. Bend Motor Bus Co., 142 N.E. 423, 424 (Ind. 1924) (holding that the
courts “are not authorized to pass upon or question the motives which actuated the legislature in
passing the act, our concern being whether the act as finally passed is or is not valid”); Bayh v. Ind.
State Building & Construction Trades Council, 674 N.E.2d 176, 179 (Ind. 1996) (the courts’
“inquiry into whether an act violates Art. 4, § 19 ends upon review of the final act itself”). The
problems associated with the application of the enrolled act rule to section 19 are considered in Part
III.B, infra.
180 N.E. 865 (Ind. 1932).
Id. at 868.
Id. On this particular point, this Article is in agreement. See infra Parts III.D.6 & V.
Steinwedel, 180 N.E. at 868.
Id. See also infra Parts III.C and IV.
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this court cannot say that such matters constitute more than one subject.”95
In principle, such a reasonableness test could optimally balance the mandate
that the framers and ratifiers had ensconced in the plain language of section
19 with the legislature’s otherwise unrestrained authority. But these cases
pushed the test as it was actually used into the realm of unreasonableness.
Finally, although Steinwedel acknowledged that the concepts of “subject”
and “object” are distinct, “still we think the object [purpose] of an act must
be considered in determining whether matters embraced in the act may be
reasonably treated as ‘one subject.’”96 The result was that a “subject” could
be defined so broadly as to bring nearly any infinite number of provisions
within the gambit of the “subject.”97 Potts’ mandate, requiring that a subject
be “reasonably specific,” was now entirely abandoned.98
Though section 19 had by this time been nearly wholly vanquished, the
1930s and 1940s witnessed the development of additional safeguards against
its enforcement. By the 1930s, the courts were characterizing subjects so
broadly that acts could not possibly be found in contravention of section 19;99
still, the Indiana Supreme Court began finding that any portion of an act not
obviously connected to the extremely general subject was nevertheless
“properly connected therewith.”100
The cases reiterated that any
“reasonable” basis for grouping items together in an act would render it
compliant with section 19.101 And some cases even resorted to once more
writing the single subject rule out of the Constitution.102
95.
96.
97.

Steinwedel, 180 N.E. at 868 (emphasis added).
Id.
See id. at 868–69 (finding that an act entitled “an act concerning minors” would not only be
constitutionally permissible, but desirable, in that the legislature could include “a great number of
relationships and interests peculiarly affected by legal minority”).
98. See, e.g., State ex rel. Taylor v. Greene Circuit Court, 63 N.E.2d 287, 288–89 (Ind. 1945) (reviewing
just how general titles may be in Indiana and upholding the title at issue since “[a] more general
title is difficult to imagine . . . Because of its generality all these things may be properly inferred.”).
99. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that the Court was characterizing the subjects of acts so broadly
in order that they would not be found to violate section 19. Such causality between the manner of
characterizing subjects and the conclusion of constitutional validity, however, is precisely the
opposite of what the framers and ratifiers intended. See generally Evans & Bannister, supra note
1. The test for single subject compliance had eroded the rule to the point that it was nearly a dead
letter. See also infra Part III.D.6 (discussing the rule as a dead letter).
100. See, e.g., Bolivar Bd. of Finance of Benton Co. v. Hawkins, 191 N.E. 158, 161 (Ind. 1934).
101. See, e.g., Stith Petroleum Co. v. Ind. Dept. of Audit & Control, 5 N.E.2d 517, 521 (Ind. 1937).
102. See, e.g., Tucker v. Muesing, 39 N.E.2d 738 (Ind. 1942). Tucker held that section 19’s concern “is
the sufficiency of titles to sustain legislation, and it does not undertake to enumerate other grounds
upon which legislation may be declared invalid.” Id. at 739 (emphasis added). This is inaccurate.
The single subject rule, distinct from the title requirement, established additional grounds upon
which legislation should be declared invalid: by being a product of logrolling and by embracing
two or more subjects. See Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 33–34); see also remarks
of Mr. Pettit, 2 REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE
REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA 2009 (Indiana Historical Bureau 1936)
(1850) (hereafter “DEBATES”) (noting that if the single subject rule was to be included in the new
constitution, “you will constantly have your courts construing two questions: first, as to whether a

2015]

Reanimating the States’ Single Subject Jurisprudence

179

Cases since the Second World War have been similarly at odds with the
framers’ intent. The modern zenith was realized in Dague v. Piper
Aircraft.103 Although by the time Dague was decided the title requirement
had been removed from section 19, this decision, like many of its
predecessors, attributed the purpose of the title requirement to the single
subject restriction.104 Dague reiterated that “a very liberal interpretation is to
be applied, with all doubts resolved in favor of the legislation’s validity,”
such that combinations are allowed which “at first blush, might appear quite
diverse.”105 Dague confirmed that even today, the courts will characterize
the subject of an act so broadly that virtually any two items may be included
in the act. Other modern cases have continued applying the enrolled act
doctrine to the single subject rule106 and have even applied additional hurdles
to section 19’s enforcement.107
2. Why the Common Law Developed as It Did
Several reasons explain why such a tremendous divergence arose
between the framers’ intent108 and judicial interpretation. First, the duty of
enforcing the single subject rule is difficult. The framers crafted a section
that, while conceptually straight-forward, is challenging to apply.109 Second,
the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent has been misunderstood; in the vast majority
of cases, no effort whatsoever was made to ascertain this intent, with no
citation to the Debates made.110 The few cases that attempted to do so were
extraordinarily cursory and did not seek to analyze the framers’ intent with

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

110.

bill contains two subjects, and secondly, whether these subjects are expressed in the title of the
bill.”). Of course, logrolling can be undertaken without direct evidence in the legislature’s
procedural records: this scenario occurs when legislators swap votes without combining their
measures into a single bill, instead swapping votes on separate bills. But this form of vote-swapping
did not concern the framers of the Indiana Constitution; in fact, supporters of the single subject rule
endorsed this means of vote-swapping as an alternative to the practice prohibited by section 19. See
Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 13). Vote-swapping in the sense of “a bill for a
bill” was not deemed to be “logrolling” as far as the framers were concerned, since under this
arrangement, each disparate subject received its own, independent consideration and scrutiny before
the legislature. Id.
418 N.E.2d 207 (Ind. 1981).
See id. at 214–15 (finding that “the title of the act specifically mentions the subject matter of section
twenty-eight” such that no one could be deceived as to the location of a provision in the act).
Id. at 214 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Bayh v. Ind. State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 674 N.E.2d 176, 179 (Ind. 1996).
See Pence v. State, 652 N.E.2d 486 (Ind. 1995) (declining to hear the single subject claim by finding
a lack of standing to make a constitutional challenge).
See supra Part I; see also generally Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (discussing the framers’ and
ratifiers’ intentions as to section 19).
See supra Part II (discussing the challenges of fashioning a single subject test); see also supra note
18 and accompanying text (noting that even as of the 1860s, the court’s single subject jurisprudence
was as uncertain as it had been a decade before).
See generally supra Part II.
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any degree of vigor.111 Third, section 19’s broad language invited myriad
innovative interpretations.112
Fourth, a genuine respect for the legislative branch and for the
separation of powers also contributed to the judiciary’s hesitation to nullify
acts on the basis of section 19. While this respect is as virtuous as it is
necessary under the Constitution, Indiana’s framers did not view their
delegation of enforcement to the courts as discourtesy toward the legislative
branch, and would indeed be surprised to find courts today deferring in this
area. Institutionalizing certain restraints upon the legislative branch was the
entire motive for calling the 1850 Convention.113 The framers recognized
that such institutionalization cannot occur in the absence of judicial
enforcement of the rule.114 Neither can elections institutionalize the rule.115
If elections were the answer, then the 1816 Constitution would not have been
viewed as a failure in this respect. Moreover, a public majority might support
a course of action in violation of the Constitution—but this has never been
grounds for judicial abdication. Indeed, one of the judiciary’s primary
purposes is to delineate the limits imposed upon majority rule by the
constitution itself. In the U.S. tradition, majority rule has never been viewed
as absolute.116 Fifth, judges were elected by popular partisan vote until the
1970s. Many judges had political careers preceding and following their
service in the courts and brought active partisan predispositions to the
bench.117 This was especially true when ideological emotions ran high in the
Civil War era.
Finally, the difficulty of an alternative to near-absolute deference has
pervaded the background of virtually every single subject decision to date.
The beginnings of an alternative framework are considered below.118 Other
areas of constitutional jurisprudence, many of which are at least as
challenging as the single subject rule, have developed over time; there is no
inherent reason why today’s courts cannot similarly fulfill the framers’ and
ratifiers’ intentions for section 19.

111. See generally supra Part II.
112. Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 29 n.166); see also supra text accompanying note
29 n.166; see also supra Part II (noting the rule’s broad language).
113. See Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 4-7).
114. See supra notes 27-29; see also supra text accompanying notes 27-29; see also generally Jacob E.
Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121 HARV. L. REV. 543 (2007)
(discussing principal-agent problems in the context of legislative bodies).
115. See infra Part III.D.3 (discussing majority rule and the single subject rule).
116. See infra Part III.D.3.
117. See generally JEROME L. WITHERED, HOOSIER JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
INDIANA (1998); see also John G. Baker, Indiana Judges: A Portrait of Judicial Evolution, in THE
HISTORY OF INDIANA LAW 303, 319 (David J. Bodenhamer & Hon. Randall T. Shepherd eds., 2006)
(noting that the Indiana judiciary experienced a “political phase”).
118. See infra Part V.
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III. THE NEED FOR AN ALTERNATIVE: FAULT LINES IN
INDIANA’S JURISPRUDENCE
A. Overview
Prior scholarship119 has established two key features of section 19’s
original language that have gone unacknowledged in Indiana’s decisional
law. First, the single subject requirement and the title requirement, though
intended to work together, were discrete requirements.120 While the title
requirement was eliminated in 1974, the single subject rule remains a viable
provision of the Constitution still defined by the intent of the Constitution’s
framers and ratifiers.121 Second, the single subject rule was, and remains,
dual-pronged.122 The rule was intended to prevent logrolling within the
legislature. Since logrolling concerns the passage of legislation, this is the
single subject rule’s procedural prong.123 Section 19’s plain text, meanwhile,
limits acts to one subject and matters properly connected therewith. This
goes to the actual contents of acts, and is the single subject rule’s substantive
prong. The rule’s earnest enforcement would nullify acts that are shown to
either (1) be the product of logrolling or (2) embrace a multiplicity of
subjects.124
The decisional law has incapacitated each of these prongs. The enrolled
act rule serves as a formal bar to the judicial enforcement of article IV’s
procedural requirements (including the single subject rule), while the practice
of near-absolute deference, grounded in the notion of infinite reasonableness,
has deflated the single subject rule’s substantive prong. 125 These
relationships can be illustrated thusly:

119. See generally Evans & Bannister, supra note 1.
120. Id. (manuscript at 11–14). Other states have drawn a similar conclusion. See, e.g., Harbor v.
Deukmejian, 742 P.2d 1290, 1300 (Cal. 1987) (in California, “the two aspects of section 9 relating
to the subject of an act and its title are independent provisions which serve separate purposes. A
statute must comply with both the requirement that it be confined to one subject and with the
command that this one subject be expressed in its title.”).
121. Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 35–42).
122. Id. (manuscript at 33–34). Some cases have recognized the relationship between multi-subject acts
and logrolling. See, e.g., Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 465 (Wis. 1992) (“Multi-subject bills
by their nature are subject to a greater susceptibility of smuggling and logrolling.”).
123. Consistent with this procedural prong, the current rules of both houses of the Indiana legislature
require amendments to be germane to the subject matter under consideration. See sections 80, 118,
and 119, Rules, House of Representatives 118th Indiana General Assembly and sections 55 and
66(b) Senate 2013-2014 Standing Rules and Orders, 118th Indiana General Assembly, available at
http://iga.in.gov/legislative/2014/rules/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2015).
124. Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 33–34).
125. See infra Parts III.B & III.C.
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Section 19
Title requirement
(eliminated 1974)
Purpose: to prevent
legislator deception

Single subject
requirement

Procedural prong
Purpose: to prevent logrolling
Defeated by: enrolled act rule

Substantive prong
Purpose: to prevent multiple subjects
Defeated by: infinite reasonableness

In addition to the two major doctrines frustrating the enforcement of the
single subject rule (the enrolled act rule and the doctrine of infinite
reasonableness), several other smaller hurdles have also arisen. Each of these
is considered below. We argue that the courts should immediately remove
these hurdles to section 19’s enforcement.
B. The Enrolled Act Rule: Removing the Procedural Roadblock to
Enforcement
In 1890 (regrettably, twenty-one years after the enrolled act rule was
announced), the Indiana Supreme Court declared that:
[I]t is beyond belief that the framers [of the Indiana Constitution] were
guilty of the folly of inserting therein conflicting, or inconsistent provisions.
So, if it can be shown that such conclusion renders meaningless a single
word or sentence in the Constitution [the interpretation] must fall, for it
cannot be maintained that any word in an instrument of so much importance
as this was not to have a potent meaning. There may well exist a difference
of opinion as to the proper meaning to be given to some of the words, or
sentences, there found, owing to the imperfections of our language; but
there should be no dispute as to the fact that some meaning is to be attached
to each and every word found therein, and we are not at liberty to attach to
any word there found a meaning that will conflict with any other word, or
sentence, or the well known intent of the framers of the Constitution.126

Thus, precedents in conflict with the framers’ intent or shown to create
conflict between various constitutional provisions not only can be, but must
be, repudiated by the courts.

126. State ex rel. Collett v. Gorby, 23 N.E. 678, 680 (Ind. 1890) (emphasis added).
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This paper has thus far demonstrated that the framers’ intent for section
19, while it could have (and should have) been well-known, was not wellestablished or often cited in the single subject precedents. As this portion of
the Article will reveal, the court’s reading of article III of the Constitution (in
which the enrolled act rule is grounded) is purely a matter of judicial
inference—an inferential reading that produces unnecessary conflict between
article III and section 19. Courts today, however, have the opportunity to
correct the legal anachronism known as the enrolled act rule.
1. The Enrolled Act Rule—Theory and Application
The enrolled act rule has been applied specifically to Indiana’s single
subject rule.127 Three particular cases illustrate the enrolled act rule’s
foundations and influence.
a. Evans v. Browne
The enrolled act rule was announced in Evans v. Browne.128 As noted
above,129 Thomas Browne claimed a payment from John Evans, the State
Auditor, which had been authorized by the legislature. Evans refused to pay
claiming that, prior to the act’s final passage, forty-two members of the
Indiana House had resigned, rendering that chamber constitutionally unfit to
transact business by bringing its membership beneath its quorum.130 The
court held that so long as an act was authenticated by the presiding officers
of each chamber of the General Assembly, as required by article IV, section
25, the courts were not at liberty to look to the legislature’s journals or other
external evidence to test the compliance of an act with the procedural
requirements of article IV.131 In other words, authentication was absolute
evidence of the act’s compliance with the Constitution’s procedural
requirements, including the need for a quorum.
The Court first held that “[t]he very fact that [a legislative body]
proceeds with legislative business must . . . be . . . very strong evidence of
the presence of a quorum; for, if a quorum were not present, then a duty
imposed by parliamentary law upon the presiding officer has not been
performed; and it is not becoming that one co-ordinate department of the
government should thus condemn another.”132 By begging the question,
then, the court signaled an unwillingness even to consider evidence of
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See Bayh v. Ind. State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 674 N.E.2d 176, 179 (Ind. 1996).
See generally Evans v. Browne, 30 Ind. 514 (1869).
See supra notes 83–85; see also text accompanying notes 83–85.
Evans, 30 Ind. at 514–15.
Id. at 527.
Id. at 522.
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constitutional violations so long as the provisions violated were procedural
in nature.133 The Evans Court was unmoved by the Indiana framers’ intention
that the courts would nullify procedurally uncompliant acts.134 The framers
found it entirely acceptable—indeed, necessary—that each branch would
“condemn” the others on the occasions they surpass the boundaries of the
Constitution.
The Evans Court next held that the legislature “must, in the first
instance, judge for itself as to the presence of a quorum. No other tribunal
can so well ascertain the fact as itself; and it would seem scarcely fit,
therefore, that courts should be at liberty to enter into that investigation.”135
It is entirely unclear why the court inferred that, because the legislature was
in the best position to judge the presence of a quorum, it therefore follows
that the courts cannot judge the question. Moreover, the House’s own
journal reflected the absence of a quorum. Evans’ metaphysical principle is
its own undoing: if the House is in the best position to document the
fulfillment of its own procedural obligations, then it seems the courts should
be comfortable relying upon the journals as evidence of this compliance. 136
Moreover, the legislature equally “decides for itself” the constitutionality of
every act it passes; implicit in every bill the legislature passes is its
determination that the bill is constitutional. Yet the courts have voided laws
under judicial review since the earliest days of statehood.137 Finally, it should
be noted that Evans’ reasoning is a step away from the rule of law. The
133. See generally id.
134. This unwillingness to test acts for compliance with the Constitution’s procedural requirements
would later function as an absolute bar against the single subject rule’s procedural prong. See supra
note 124; infra Part III.B.3 (discussing the enrolled act rule’s application to the single subject rule).
See also Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 8, 28–29, 34–35) (documenting that the
framers intended that the courts would enforce the single subject rule); see also id. (manuscript at
33–34) (noting that the framers intended to include—and indeed did include—a procedural prong
within the single subject rule).
135. Evans, 30 Ind. at 522.
136. Some states have struck a moderated position on the use of external evidence in assessing an act’s
compliance with procedural requirements. See generally, e.g., Jensen v. Matheson, 583 P.2d 77
(Utah 1978) (discussing the enrolled act rule and generally endorsing it on the grounds that the
courts ought not oversee the legislature’s internal workings, but holding nevertheless that because
the journals are constitutionally required of the legislature, the courts may look to the journals but
to no other extrinsic evidence to test enrolled acts for procedural compliance). This paper urges
that Jensen did not go far enough, as the rule’s framers and ratifiers specifically intended an active
judicial role in ensuring the legislature’s compliance with procedural requirements. See generally
Evans & Bannister, supra note 1.
137. See, e.g., Clark v. Ellis, 2 Blackf. 8, 10 (Ind. 1826) (noting that the court had “heretofore decided
that a part of an act of assembly being unconstitutional, does not affect a constitutional part of the
same act relative to the same subject,” and thus, “[t]hat part which is unconstitutional, is considered
as if stricken out of the act; and if enough remains to be intelligibly acted upon, it is considered as
the law of the land . . . .”); see also Armstrong v. Jackson, 1 Blackf. 374, 376 (Ind. 1825) (finding
one portion of the statute at issue “unconstitutional and void”). See also infra note 186 and
accompanying text (citing Municipal City of S. Bend v. Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d 683 (Ind. 2003) for this
proposition).
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framers and early courts under the 1851 Constitution recognized that judicial
review is an integral, indispensable part of limited government.138 It has also
been well-documented that the entire purpose of calling the 1850 convention
was to limit government—in particular, to limit the legislative authority of
the State.139 This is commensurate with the framers’ express intention that
the courts would vigorously enforce section 19.140 If as a matter of law the
courts refuse to condemn constitutional violations because they are of a
particular breed (e.g., procedural violations), then the legislature is
incentivized to act as through the requirements do not exist at all.141 Indeed,
Evans’ approach is itself an unconstitutional abdication of the judicial
authority allocated by article III.142
The Evans opinion next asserted that “the question of the presence of a
quorum is a legislative and not a judicial question,” and that “the courts, in a
case like this, cannot inquire into it without passing beyond their jurisdiction
as limited by the constitution, and thereby invading the field which belongs
exclusively to the legislature.”143 In support of this position, the court cited
article III of the Constitution, Indiana’s separation of powers article.144 As
discussed below,145 this argument is flawed since article III does not demand
deference from the courts on these questions—indeed, article III imposes an
affirmative duty on the courts to exercise the judicial power of the State. The
Evans Court also asserted that article III mandates branches of government
138. See generally, e.g., Madison & Indianapolis R.R. Co. v. Whiteneck, 8 Ind. 217 (1856) (noting, inter
alia, that in the absence of constitutional restrictions, the legislative power would be unbounded;
that the courts are, in practice, the only institutions capable of enforcing the constitution’s
limitations upon the legislature; and that “[t]he courts of justice are to be considered the bulwarks
of a limited constitution.”) (quoting Federalist No. 68)).
139. See Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 4-7).
140. See id. (manuscript at 8, 28–29, 34–35).
141. Pence v. State, 652 N.E.2d 486, 490 (Ind. 1995) (Dickson, J., dissenting) (noting the “resulting
implied invitation to the General Assembly to accord minimal attention to the single-subject
requirement in our Constitution,” “[d]ue to [the Indiana Supreme Court’s] prior reluctance to
enforce the single-subject-per-act requirement.”). Another problem concerning incentives arises
such that when prospective litigants believe that the courts will not enforce a constitutional
provision, litigants are discouraged from raising colorable questions of law. Indeed, some courts
have expressed annoyance that their high or absolute degrees of deference to the legislature have
not been more discouraging to litigants. See, e.g., Balt. Transit Co. v. Metro. Transit Auth., 194
A.2d 643, 649 (Md. 1963) (“Although we have repeatedly held that every presumption favors the
validity of a statute and it will not be declared unconstitutional unless it plainly contravenes the
Constitution, litigants seize upon every opportunity to claim a violation of the above provisions
[including the single subject rule], if they feel there is any possibility of a successful challenge.”).
The response that settled precedents are intended to provide the efficiencies achieved through
certainties in the law (and the need not to relitigate settled questions) is unmoving in the
constitutional context, where stare decisis does not apply with its usual force. See infra note 228;
see also infra text accompanying note 228.
142. See infra notes 136–40, and infra Part III.B.2.
143. Evans, 30 Ind. at 522.
144. Id. at 523.
145. See infra Part III.B.2.
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“separate and independent of each other . . . wholly beyond the control of the
other,”146 and that as a result, the authentication of statues is a legislative
function that is per se outside the scope of judicial cognizance.147 The
infirmities of these arguments are considered at length below.148
Beyond the article III arguments, the Evans Court also found that the
only possible reason for requiring authentication was to establish an absolute
verification that all procedural requirements had been observed.149 This
assertion, however, is demonstrably flawed because the authentication
requirement was also included in Indiana’s 1816 Constitution.150 This fact
suggests other possible reasons for the authentication requirement’s inclusion
in the 1851 document,151 but it also reveals a critical flaw in the Evans
opinion’s reasoning. The 1816 Constitution imposed no other procedural
conscriptions upon the legislature.152 If the authentication requirement was
included for no reason other than to verify compliance with procedural
requirements, one wonders why the identical requirement was included in the
1816 Constitution, which contained no procedural directives. The
authentication requirement was not included in the 1851 Constitution to
provide unquestionable evidence of procedural compliance; rather, it was
simply a tradition imported from the 1816 Constitution.
The Evans Court then asserted that the legislative journals were not
reliable evidentiary records.153 “Such journals,” the court reasoned, “it is
notorious, are, and must be, made in haste, in the confusion of business, and
are often inaccurate.”154 Several problems pervade this characterization of
the journals. The journals are just as constitutionally required as are the
authenticating signatures on acts. If the courts can presume the accuracy of
the authentications, then they can, as a constitutional matter, just as reliably
presume the accuracy of the journals. In reality, of course, the journals are
made in the haste of business—but so are statutes. Laws are passed under
the same circumstances of haste, in the confusion of business. This is one of
146.
147.
148.
149.

150.
151.

152.
153.
154.

Evans, 30 Ind. at 522–23.
Id.
See infra Part III.B.2.
See Evans, 30 Ind. at 523 (“What possible object, then, was sought to be accomplished by it, unless
it was to furnish evidence that the paper thus attested had been by the proper processes of each
house clothed with the force of law—evidence upon the enrolled act itself which should be taken
as authentication and prove itself upon inspection?”). Curiously, this position is wholly
unsubstantiated in the 1850 Convention Debates.
See IND. CONST. of 1816 art. III, § 17.
It is entirely possible, for example, that the framers of the 1851 Constitution simply borrowed the
authentication requirement for the sake of retaining it, or that the framers wished to impress upon
the officers of the legislature the solemn nature of the constitutional requirements, having observed
so many legislative abuses under the 1816 Constitution. See Evans & Bannister, supra note 1
(manuscript at 4–7).
See generally IND. CONST. of 1816 art. III.
Evans, 30 Ind. at 524.
Id.
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the very reasons that Indiana has always recognized judicial review.155 If the
journals are unreliable because they are made in haste, then the judgment of
the legislature as to the substantive constitutionality of its acts is also
undeserving of deference, or the presumption of validity with which acts are
cloaked. If, on the other hand, the presumption of constitutionality is
appropriate, then the journals, made under the same circumstances as the acts
themselves, should be accorded a presumption of accuracy, rendering them
reliable evidentiary records.156
The Evans opinion next declares that the risk of corrupt officers abusing
the legislative process by authenticating procedurally non-compliant acts is
simply a risk that society must embrace:
[h]uman governments must repose confidence in officers . . . Nor is there
any great force in the argument . . . that some important provisions of the
constitution would be a dead letter if inquiry may not be made by the courts
beyond the rolls. This argument overlooks the fact that legislators are sworn
to support the constitution, or else it assumes that they will willfully violate
that oath.157

The irony, of course, is that Indiana’s framers reposed their confidence in the
State’s judicial officers, mandating that “the courts will decide”158 single
subject issues. Three discrete branches of government have long been
viewed in American political thought as optimal precisely because citizens
are unwilling to cloak their elected officials in a presumption of fidelity.
Hence, America’s founders discerned that “[a]mbition must be made to
counteract ambition.”159 Ironically, the acceptance of this very idea in
Indiana was a key motivator for section 19’s inclusion in the 1851

155. See Ind. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 681 (Ind. 1856) (the court acknowledged this early on when
it wrote that section 19 “assumes that the law-making power will, in the short time allowed for the
discharge of much business, improperly confound matters under a given title, and charges the
Courts, who act deliberately, and generally upon much discussion by counsel, with the duty of
weeding out and classifying sections . . . .” The review of acts for constitutional compliance is
inherently a judicial duty; this is part of the reason the people delegated section’s 19 enforcement
to the courts); see also infra Part III.B.2.
156. One of Evans’ great ironies—and perhaps an explanation for why the opinion did not reference the
Debates—is that the framers made clear that one of the principal reasons for requiring the journals,
and for empowering just two members to demand the recording of the yeas and nays in those
journals, was to prevent the passage of bills without a quorum. See, e.g., remarks of Mr. Miller of
Gibson, 2 DEBATES 1075 (in arguing in favor of empowering just two in either chamber to demand
the yeas and nays, asking “[h]ow often do you find it the case, when the yeas and nays are called
that there is no quorum present?”); remarks of Mr. Read of Clark, id. at 1076 (in discussing the
evils of legislative minorities passing bills, noting that “[t]he reason” minorities are able to pass
bills was “the yeas and nays were not taken”).
157. Evans, 30 Ind. at 526–27.
158. See Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 28–29, 34–35).
159. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
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Constitution.160 Experience has demonstrated that constitutional provisions
exempt from judicial review are often dead letters in practice, at least where
natural incentives to violate the provisions exist.161 For this reason, the
framers intended that the single subject rule would have practical force in the
real-world, and that the courts would enforce it.162
The final piece of Evans’ analysis declared that “[i]t is not fit that the
judiciary should claim for itself a purity beyond others; nor has it been able
that all times with truth to say that its high places have not been disgraced.”163
In denying the courts’ duty to evaluate constitutional questions with this red
herring, Evans missed the more crucial point.
b. Colbert v. Wheeler
In Colbert v. Wheeler,164 the court reaffirmed its adherence to the
enrolled act rule. Here, one of the parties sought to establish by oral
testimony that a particular bill had been vetoed. The Court held that oral
testimony was inadmissible for this purpose because “the silence of the house
journal, upon a matter which, if it occurred, the Constitution requires the
house to enter it upon its journal, is conclusive that it did not occur as against
oral testimony to the contrary. To hold otherwise is to overlook the fact that
legislators are sworn to support the Constitution, or else assume they have
willfully violated their oath.”165
By 1909, then, the court’s view had evolved in one respect from its
position in Evans, in which it held the journals inadmissible by virtue of their
inevitable inaccuracy.166 Colbert found the journals not only a reliable
memorial of events, but an absolute and unquestionable memorial.
Amazingly, these irreconcilable positions were both held to support the
enrolled act rule; the doctrine enjoys such great flexibility that it is conducive
160. The primary motive for calling the 1850 Convention was the restraint of the state’s legislative
power. The courts were conceived as playing a key role in this architecture. See generally Evans
& Bannister, supra note 1. Modern economic commentary notes that legislators have a natural
incentive to logroll; doing so enables legislators to express the intensity of their policy preferences
by, in effect, controlling more than one vote on the issues most important to them. JEFFERY L.
HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 399-401 (4th ed. 2007). Outcomes under
logrolling tend to be stable. See also id. at 400. In Indiana’s case, the “stable outcome” was the
consistency with which otherwise unpassable bills were logrolled into acts. See Evans & Bannister,
supra note 1 (manuscript at 4–7). This is precisely what Indiana’s framers sought to avoid by
including the single subject rule and by delegating to the courts the duty of its enforcement.
161. There was, in the framers’ experience, a natural tendency for the legislature to do all of the things
prohibited by article IV’s restrictions. See Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 4–35);
see also supra note 151.
162. Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 30).
163. Evans, 30 Ind. at 527.
164. See generally State v. Wheeler, 89 N.E. 1 (Ind. 1909).
165. Id. at 5.
166. See supra note 145; see also text accompanying note 145.
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to shifting (and irreconcilable) rationales. The enrolled act rule is not a
natural consequence of article III’s plain language.167
Colbert is noteworthy for a second reason. Like Evans, Colbert insisted
that any judicial inquiry into these questions either (1) ignores the fact that
legislators take an oath to support the Indiana Constitution, or (2) necessarily
assumes that legislators have willfully violated their oaths by passage of the
particular act in question.168 This, too, is misguided. The courts need not
(and in fact, do not)169 assume any ill-will on the legislature’s part.170
Alternatively, if this presumption exists, then it seems that all of judicial
review must be renounced; for the same assumption must presumably apply
with equal force when the courts review an act for compliance with the
Constitution’s substantive requirements. A more accurate assessment is that
the enrolled act rule assumes perfection on the part of the legislature—a
notion the Indiana framers would find most unpalatable.171
c. Roeschlein v. Thomas
The court’s most recent extensive elaboration in support of the enrolled
act rule was provided in the 1972 case of Roeschlein v. Thomas.172 The
Plaintiff in this case sued to enjoin the Governor from implementing the
Constitution’s newly adopted judicial article (article VII), which had just
been revised to change the method of selecting appellate judges from popular
election to gubernatorial appointment.173 The Plaintiff claimed that the
legislature had not passed the proposed amendment in accordance with
article XVI, section 1 of the Indiana Constitution (governing constitutional
amendments); specifically, the Plaintiff asserted that the legislature had
neglected to record the yeas and nays in the journals, as required.174
167. See infra Part III.B.2.
168. Wheeler, 89 N.E. at 5.
169. See, e.g., State v. Barclay, 708 P.2d 972, 977 (Kan. 1985) (noting that “courts are bound to presume
that the legislature did not intend to violate the Constitution”).
170. Significantly, the legislature’s intent is not germane to questions of constitutionality. Courts have
never held that an act otherwise clearly in conflict with the Constitution should be sustained because
the legislature had “good intentions” in passing it. The Constitution itself does not create exceptions
for “good intentions.” The only inquiry is whether an act violates the Constitution, not whether it
was intended to violate the Constitution. See also 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 186 (2014)
(“Just as bad motives of the legislators do not nullify laws passed within the bounds of the
Constitution, good motives or good faith on the part of the legislators in passing a law will be
ineffective in sustaining it if it clearly violates the provisions of the Constitution. However
meritorious its purpose, legislation must of necessity conform to fundamental constitutional
principles.”).
171. See Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 4–7) (noting that the driving force behind the
calling of the 1850 Constitutional Convention was the curtailment of the legislative power).
172. See generally Roeschlein v. Thomas, 280 N.E.2d 581 (Ind. 1972).
173. Id. at 583.
174. Id. at 584.
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The court first made several preliminary assertions. For instance, the
court distinguished the Plaintiff’s cited case of Ellingham v. Dye, in which it
was held that the legislature had violated Article 16 by passing a
constitutional amendment in the form of a conventional bill (as opposed to a
joint resolution).175 The court declared that Ellingham was distinguishable
since the journals were not consulted in voiding the act passed there; rather,
“[s]ince there was no pretense of following [Article 16’s] steps, the
legislature acted without authority as was apparent on the face of the bill.”176
The Roeschlein Court mischaracterized Ellingham and its rule of law. The
legislature’s act in Ellingham violated the Constitution not because there was
an absence of a “pretense” of compliance, but rather because the legislature
in fact did not comply with the Constitution. In light of the Constitution’s
fundamental status and the intent of the framers, it would seem that it is actual
compliance, and not “pretenses,” that should be the measure of
constitutionality. Roeschlein reaffirmed the counterproductive rule that
procedural failures unapparent on the face of an act are de facto
constitutional.177 The enrolled act rule declares that procedural constitutional
violations are per se acceptable so long as they are well-masked or latent.
This defeats the entire purpose of including the Constitution’s procedural
mandates, and defeats the framers’ intent.178
The Roeschlein Court also reiterated the key propositions in Evans and
Colbert: namely, that the legislature acted in “good faith” in passing the acts
in question,179 and that the authentication requirement mandates absolute
deference from the courts on procedural questions.180
Roeschlein is of the greatest interest, however, because it synopsizes
the court’s primary reasons for retaining the enrolled act rule. After
endorsing Evans’ principal finding—that the enrolled act rule is mandated by
article III of the Constitution181—the court commenced its discussion of why
the enrolled act rule remains important. First, the court asserted, was “[t]he
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 588–89.
Id. at 589.
Id. at 594–95.
Neither is it sufficient to argue that the electoral process provides a sufficient check against
legislative procedural violations. The framers recognized that an unorganized citizenry was not in
a position to hold legislators accountable in masse for their constitutional violations. The abuses
the framers sought to curtail in the new Constitution had long prevailed under the 1816 document,
even though these practices had long been criticized by the public. See Evans & Bannister, supra
note 1 (manuscript at 4–7). And even if a majority of the public approved of procedural violations,
this would not justify the courts’ pacification. If the rule of law is to mean anything, then the
Constitution’s provisions must be observed so long as they remain part of the Constitution. See
State ex rel. Hovey v. Noble, 21 N.E. 244, 245 (Ind. 1889) (“Until the people themselves shall
change or annul their constitution, all must obey its mandates.”).
179. Roeschlein, 280 N.E.2d at 589.
180. Id. at 589–90; see also supra Parts III.B.1.a & III. B.1.b (discussing these propositions in Evans and
Colbert).
181. See infra Part III.B.2.

2015]

Reanimating the States’ Single Subject Jurisprudence

191

need to recognize and preserve the independence and separateness of each of
the three branches of government and the functions to be performed by
them.”182 Article III must therefore be construed strictly. The two problems
with this line of reasoning are considered at length below,183 but are
mentioned here: the review of acts for constitutionality is a judicial function,
and while it is appropriate to construe article III strictly, nothing in the plain
language of the article’s text necessitates (or even allows for) the enrolled act
rule.
The Roeschlein Court’s second reason in favor of the enrolled act rule
was the belief that a “factual investigation as to whether constitutional
procedures have been followed in proposing amendments to the constitution
by joint resolution can best be conducted by the legislature, which is most
suited for that purpose.”184 The court’s conclusion, however, does not
necessarily follow from its premise. The legislature is also best-suited for
the purposes of creating statutory laws and public policy—does it therefore
follow, as an extension of Roeschlein leads, that the courts should renounce
judicial review entirely, on the grounds that all statutes originate in the
branch best-suited to their creation? The legislature implicitly approves of
the constitutionality of its own acts. Moreover, even if the opinion is correct
that the legislature is best-positioned to conduct an investigation into
procedural compliance, this fact does not preclude judicial review.
Roeschlein’s reasoning is akin to declaring that, in the case of a car accident
in which only the tortfeasor survives, the court will not inquire into factual
questions but will instead rely exclusively upon the tortfeasor’s version of
events, on the ground that the tortfeasor was at the scene of the accident and
is best-positioned to relay the facts. Courts have always relied upon factual
records. They do so because (1) the fact that the court itself did not observe
the events in question should not preclude the law’s enforcement by the
impartial judicial tribunals, and (2) the evidence-based development of facts
best ensures that reality is reflected in the courts.
The court’s third reason for retaining the enrolled act rule was that
“[c]ourts have no right to assume that the action of the authenticating officers
as public officials is false or fraudulent.”185 As the discussion of Colbert
demonstrated,186 however, the courts assume nothing of the sort, and should
indeed be entirely unconcerned with the legislature’s intent to violate or
comply with the Constitution. Courts should not be in the business of making

182. Roeschlein, 280 N.E.2d at 590.
183. See infra Part III.B.2.
184. Roeschlein, 280 N.E.2d at 590; see also supra note 128; see also text accompanying note 128
(noting the same assertion in Evans in the context of the presence of a quorum).
185. Roeschlein, 280 N.E.2d at 590; see also supra notes 159–61 (noting this argument in Colbert).
186. See supra Part III.B.1.b.
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assumptions either way.187 At all rates, to the extent the courts’ entertainment
of constitutional challenges implies fraud on the part of the legislature,
Indiana’s framers intended that the single subject rule would be enforced by
the courts, and approved of continuing judicial review precisely because they
had experienced rampant legislative fraud under the 1816 Constitution.188
The court’s final basis for favoring the enrolled act rule was its assertion
that “[t]o countenance inquiries into the journals of the legislature is to
expose every act and joint resolution of the legislature to the mercy of those
having access to the journals and thereby create an atmosphere conducive to
fraud.”189 It is not clear how, in a democracy, the exposure of public laws to
“those having access to the journals” (i.e., the citizenry) would be conducive
to fraud. At the same time, it is entirely clear how the policy of exempting
from judicial review the procedural requirements of article IV would be
conducive to fraud. The framers included these requirements in the 1851
Constitution precisely because their absence in the former constitution
invited the very fraud that the 1851 document sought to end, and delegated
the duty of enforcing these provisions to the judiciary.
To summarize, then, the Indiana Supreme Court has considered a
number of cases over time addressing the judiciary’s power to review
legislative actions and has generally given great deference to the legislature’s
procedural maneuvers. The enrolled act rule declares that procedural
constitutional violations are per se acceptable so long as they are wellmasked or latent. This deference defeats the very purpose of the
Constitution’s procedural mandates, and defeats the framers’ intent with
respect to the single subject rule’s procedural prong.190
2. Article III—Theory and Application
Article III of the Indiana Constitution, which consists only of one
section, reads as follows:
The powers of the Government are divided into three separate departments;
the Legislative, the Executive including the Administrative, and the
Judicial: and no person, charged with official duties under one of these
departments, shall exercise any of the functions of another, except as in this
Constitution expressly provided.191

187. Even facts judicially noticed are grounded in empirical evidence or experience, and are therefore
not “assumed” in this sense.
188. See Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 4–7).
189. Roeschlein, 280 N.E.2d at 590.
190. See generally Evans & Bannister, supra note 1.
191. IND. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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And article IV, section 1 declares that “[t]he Legislative authority of the
State shall be vested in a General Assembly . . . .”192 We have seen that the
framers specifically intended that single subject issues would be judicial
questions to be resolved through judicial review.193 Even if this was not the
case, however, the enrolled act rule still lacks support in article III.
While article III and article IV, section 1 dictate that the legislative
authority shall be vested in the General Assembly, they “do not define that
legislative authority; they simply ordain a division of powers and designate
the department in which the legislative, whatever it may be, shall be
lodged.”194 Hence, it fell to the judiciary to discern the parameters of the
legislative power, and to determine the meaning of article III. As an initial
matter, however, Evans and its progeny were incorrect to assert that article
III necessitates the enrolled act rule. In merely allocating the “legislative
authority” to the legislature, article III neither necessitates nor intimates that
the legislature will go unchecked by the other branches. One defining feature
of a constitution is that no faction or generation may disregard it out of
expediency. The right to amend the Constitution is clear, but the power to
ignore it is found nowhere.
Article III’s history also cuts against the legitimacy of the enrolled act
rule. Article III was included in the 1816 Constitution.195 The first version
of article III to be proposed at the 1816 Convention stated that “no person or
persons duly elected and qualified to serve in one branch of the government,
shall, during his continuance in office, be eligible to or have any concern in
the duties of either of the other two branches of the government, except in
the instances herein after expressly permitted or enjoined.”196 But this
language was ultimately rejected. Throughout its iterations in the 1816 and
1851 Constitutions, no version of article III has forbidden one branch from
having “any concern in the duties of” the other branches. Instead, the 1816
and 1851 documents simply prohibited the exercise by one branch of the
powers of the other branches. The framers of both constitutions realized that
to prohibit any concern with the duties of the other branches would
necessarily preclude checks and balances, including judicial review. Had this
language been retained, the enrolled act rule might legitimately claim to be a
product of article III.
Whatever the “legislative authority” is, moreover, the decisional law
has long uniformly acknowledged that it does not extend to that which the
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. art. 4, § 1.
See Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 28–29, 34–35).
Madison & Indianapolis R.R. Co. v. Whiteneck, 8 Ind. 217, 220 (1856).
See IND. CONST. of 1816 art. II.
See 1816 Convention Journal – June 10 – June 14, 1816, IN.GOV, http://www.in.gov/history/
2887.htm (entry of “Thursday Morning, Nine o’clock, June 13, 1816”) (last visited Mar. 13, 2015)
(emphasis added).
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Constitution expressly forbids.197 If the courts inquire into alleged breaches
of article IV’s procedural requirements and discover that the requirements
were in fact followed, the law will be upheld as constitutional, and no
invasion of the legislature’s interest has been accomplished. If on the other
hand the courts find that the procedural requirements were not followed and
the law is voided, this, too, avoids an impermissible invasion of the
legislature’s authority since the passage of an act non-compliant with the
Constitution’s procedural requirements is not within the legislative authority
to begin with.
This reasoning applies equally to article III’s fount of judicial authority.
“In employing the term ‘the judicial power’ the constitution refers to the
power as it then existed . . . . It means the power which the people understood
to be vested in judges, for no other power is judicial.”198 And the power
“vested in judges,” as it existed under both the 1816 Constitution and at the
time of the 1850 Convention, included judicial review:
[B]oth the 1816 and 1851 constitutions were adopted at a time when judicial
review of legislation for conformity to constitutional text was well
established. As we held in Dawson v. Shaver, 1 Blackf. 204, 206-07 (1822),
citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803): “The task is
delicate and unpleasant, but the duty of the Court is imperative, and its
authority is unquestionable, to declare any part of a statute null and void
that expressly contravenes the provisions of the constitution, to which the
legislature itself owes its existence.”199

Only with the advent of the enrolled act rule in 1869 did the court suddenly
exempt article IV’s procedural requirements from the realm of justiciable
constitutional questions. Cases preceding Evans, including the earliest cases
decided under the 1851 Constitution, uniformly held that the legislative
journals and other extrinsic evidence could be consulted to determine
whether an act failed to meet the procedural requirements of the
Constitution.200 Hence, from 1851 until 1869, article III was not read to
prohibit judicial inquiry into questions of the legislature’s procedural
197. See, e.g., 5A IND. LAW ENCY., Constitutional Law § 40 (2005) (“The Legislature is supreme and
sovereign in the exercise of the law-making power thus conferred upon it, subject only to such
limitations as are imposed, expressly or by clear implication, by the Indiana Constitution . . . .”)
(emphasis added). Nor may the legislature or the courts unilaterally enlarge their respective powers
beyond the Constitution’s limitations. See, e.g., Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 514 (1855).
198. State ex rel. Hovey v. Noble, 21 N.E. 244, 248 (Ind. 1889). Section 19 in particular was understood
to contemplate judicial review in the very earliest cases. See supra note 30 and accompanying text
(discussing Potts). This is commensurate with the framers’ and ratifiers’ understanding as well.
Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 28–29, 34–35).
199. Municipal City of S. Bend v. Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d 683, 696 (Ind. 2003) (emphasis added).
200. See Roeschlein v. Thomas, 280 N.E.2d 581, 586 (Ind. 1972) (acknowledging the prior law and
listing example cases).
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compliance. The enrolled act rule itself overruled established precedents
approving of judicial inquiry into these questions. These facts justify the
immediate abandonment of the enrolled act rule.
The essence of article III is that “[t]he courts cannot encroach on, or
interfere with, the proper exercise of the Legislature’s constitutional powers.
Stated otherwise, the judiciary must not usurp the constitutional function of
the Legislature. Accordingly, the courts may not interfere with matters
within the discretion of the Legislature . . . .”201 The same logic undergirds
the political question doctrine, which involves matters that the Constitution
makes purely a function of legislative or executive discretion.202 The trouble
for the enrolled act rule is that, like the other procedural requirements of
article IV, the single subject rule is not in any way discretionary, nor are acts
passed in derogation of the rule an exercise of the legislature’s power.203
The enrolled act rule reallocates to the legislature the last word on a
certain breed of constitutional question—namely, whether article IV’s
procedural requirements have been met by that very body. The enrolled act
rule is itself a deviation from article III, which delegates the state’s judicial
power to the courts—a power that has uniformly been held to include
questions of the legislature’s constitutional compliance. Notwithstanding
recent assertions to the contrary,204 article III, together with article VII (the
judicial article) and the clear intent of the framers, imposes an affirmative
duty upon the courts to exercise the last word on all questions of
constitutionality that are otherwise properly brought before the courts.205 It
is equally axiomatic that any provision included in the Constitution, whether
substantive or procedural, is “constitutional”—that is to say, part of the
Constitution. Unfortunately, when the courts abdicate their duty, there is
little that either of the other branches can do to rectify the challenge, since it
is the courts themselves that are the final arbiters as to the Constitution’s
meaning. Correcting the error of the enrolled act rule must therefore be a
201. 5A IND. LAW ENCY., supra note 197, § 62 (emphasis added).
202. Parker v. State, 32 N.E. 836, 838-39 (Ind. 1892) (discussing the rationale for the political question
doctrine).
203. See Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 16 n.89 and accompanying text).
204. See State ex rel. Masariu v. Marion Superior Court No. 1, 621 N.E.2d 1097, 1098 (Ind. 1993)
(“Although it is the duty of the Courts to determine the constitutionality of statutory law, this Court
has held repeatedly that courts should not intermeddle with the internal functions of either the
Executive or Legislative branches of Government.”).
205. See, e.g., 5A IND. LAW ENCY., supra note 197, § 59 (2005) (“The courts have the exclusive
responsibility and duty to interpret the law, including the Constitution . . . Allegations that a statute
is unconstitutional are matters solely for judicial determination.”) (emphasis added); see generally
City of Evansville v. State ex rel. Blend, 21 N.E. 267 (Ind. 1889) (holding in the context of articles
III and IV, that “[a] law may be within the inhibitions of the Constitution as well by implication as
by expression. And when it is, it is the duty of the courts to so declare.”); Beebe v. State, 6 Ind.
501, 507–08, 515 (1855) (holding that the limitations upon the legislature exist to protect the
integrity of the citizenry, and that the question of a statute’s constitutionality is a judicial question,
“to be finally determined by the Courts alone”) (emphasis added).
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judicial initiative. As a creation of the courts, the enrolled act rule’s
retraction by the courts would not invade the province of the other branches.
3. Summary: A Misguided Doctrine
Several enrolled act authorities claim that the procedural requirements
in article IV are “legislative functions,” which functions the courts
themselves cannot exercise. Evans, for example, observed that “[c]ourts
should be very careful not to invade the authority of the legislature . . . No
person charged with official duties under the judicial department shall
exercise any of the functions of the legislative department.”206 This is true
insofar as the courts may not themselves authenticate an act, or pass a statute.
But this observation confuses the issue. The act of evaluating these functions
for constitutional compliance, once they are performed by the legislature, is
a judicial function. Moreover, the framers specifically intended that the
single subject rule would be enforced by the courts.207 Section 19 is in no
way self-enforcing.
In overruling the existing line of authorities, the Evans Court discarded
the fundamental principle of interpretation that “in construing constitutional
provisions, [the court] may not substitute for the clear language of the
constitution its own notions of what the provisions should have been.”208 It
is the legislature’s job to create law; it is the judiciary’s role to evaluate this
law for constitutional compliance. Contrary to the implications of Evans and
its progeny, there is no conflict between the principles of “separation of
powers” and “checks and balances.”209 Checks and balances do not
undermine the separation of powers, since the “check” of judicial review is
not an exercise of a legislative function. If Evans is correct in holding to the
contrary, then the entire doctrine of judicial review must be renounced,
because crafting the substance of acts is equally a legislative function.
Evans’ distinction between the justicibility of the Constitution’s
procedural and substantive provisions is therefore illusory. Both types of
requirement are equally mandatory; both are equally “a part” of the
Constitution, and, therefore, an act is equally unconstitutional whether it is
passed in derogation of a procedural or a substantive requirement. The
powers of authenticating an act and of creating its substance to begin with
are equally “legislative functions;” hence, the degree of “invasion” is equal
206. Evans v. Browne, 30 Ind. 514, 523 (1869).
207. See Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 28–29, 34–35).
208. 5 IND. LAW ENCY., supra note 197, § 12. We have noted many instances of early Indiana jurists
questioning what section 19 ought to have entailed. See generally supra Part II.
209. And indeed, the Indiana Supreme Court has more recently recognized that the two doctrines are
harmonious and are not a zero-sum game. See, e.g., State v. Monfort, 723 N.E.2d 407, 413 (Ind.
2000) (“The separation of powers provision exists not only to protect the integrity of each branch
of government, but also to permit each branch to serve as an effective check on the other two.”).
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whether the court voids a law based upon procedural or substantive grounds.
Neither the Constitution’s text nor the framers’ intent distinguishes between
procedural requirements and substantive requirements in defining the scope
of judicial review.
Indeed, the framers specifically intended that the courts would enforce
the single subject rule.210 It is true that “the legislature cannot interfere with
the discharge of judicial duties, or attempt to control judicial functions, or
otherwise dictate how the judiciary conducts its order of business.”211 But
this is true because the Constitution itself does not authorize legislative
inquiry into the courts’ internal operations. Such is not the case with the
legislature. The entire purpose of section 19 was the creation of a rule—one
of constitutional force—touching upon the internal mechanics of the General
Assembly. Whether this arrangement is “fair” or “sensible” is not for the
courts to say; it was the framers’ prerogative to arrange Indiana’s
constitutional order in this manner. If the General Assembly or the public
disapproves of the framer’s design, they enjoy the power to amend the
Constitution.
The enrolled act rule is a misguided doctrine and should be abandoned,
for “where the means by which [a legislative] power granted shall be
exercised are specified, no other or different means for the exercise of such
power can be implied, even though considered more convenient or effective
than the means given in the Constitution.”212 The legislature may not pass
an act through logrolling, as the framers and ratifiers understood that
notion—even if such a procedure could be deemed more convenient or
efficient.213
If the courts are unwilling to renounce the enrolled act rule altogether,
then at a minimum an exception to the rule ought to be recognized.
Roeschlein acknowledged several exceptions to the enrolled act rule—
circumstances under which the legislative journals may be consulted by the
courts.214 Indeed, one of these exceptions applies when “the very fact of the
attestation of a bill is alleged to be due to fraud and mistake of fact.” 215
Arguably, on any occasion that logrolling is proven, the authentication of the
act in question was, by definition, made under a “mistake of fact.” Finally,
even if the judicial review of procedural questions was to invoke a
“legislative function,” article III of Indiana’s Constitution provides that such

210.
211.
212.
213.

See Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 28–29, 34–35).
Monfort, 723 N.E.2d at 411.
Ellingham v. Dye, 99 N.E. 1, 15 (Ind. 1912) (emphasis added).
See Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 27–28) (noting that the Indiana convention
specifically rejected the argument that the single subject would preclude arrangements that are often
convenient for the legislature).
214. See Roeschlein v. Thomas, 280 N.E.2d 581, 588 (Ind. 1972).
215. Id. (quoting State v. Marion Circuit Court, 176 N.E. 626, 628 (Ind. 1931)).
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an exercise is permissible where “this Constitution expressly provide[s].”216
By virtue of the framers’ indisputable intent,217 Section 19 must be read to
mandate the judicial resolution of single subject disputes, including, in the
case of the section’s procedural prong,218 whether logrolling occurred in the
passage of an act.
Ultimately, the enrolled act rule resists two simple inquiries: first,
whether the Constitution’s fount of legislative authority extends to acts
expressly prohibited by the Constitution itself (the answer, of course, is
“no”); and second, whether the Constitution’s fount of judicial authority
includes the duty and obligation to void laws in derogation of the
Constitution (the answer, with equal force, is “yes”). Whether it is because
the courts renounce the enrolled act rule altogether or because an exception
is recognized for section 19, the enrolled act doctrine should not preclude the
active and consistent judicial enforcement of the single subject rule’s
procedural prong, as Indiana’s constitutional framers intended.
At one time, Indiana’s courts refused to enforce the single subject rule’s
sister provisions in sections 22 and 23, which together prohibit special and
local laws, because “[i]t was initially thought that Article IV presented no
justiciable issue.”219 In other words, it was not a judicial function to
determine whether an act was “special” or “local” in the context of article
IV.220 The modern jurisprudence, however, rejects absolute deference on
section 22 and 23 questions, acknowledging the courts’ duty to analyze
questions arising under these provisions.221 The courts should embrace this
rationale with respect to section 19, as they had before the Civil War, because
the framers’ intent, almost entirely neglected in the case law, was even more
directly stated.222
C. Infinite Reasonableness as an Unreasonable Standard: Removing the
Substantive Roadblock to Enforcement
Section 19 has long been recognized to require a test of reasonableness
to effectuate its substantive purposes (i.e., whether an act contains one or
more than one “subject”).223 The majority in Steinwedel attacked section 19
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

IND. CONST. art III, §1.
See Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 7–35).
See id. (manuscript at 33–34).
See Municipal City of S. Bend v. Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d 683, 687 (Ind. 2003).
Id. at 687–89. This was expressed as either absolute deference or as a reasonableness test in which
virtually all legislative action was held to be reasonable. See id.
221. Id. at 689–90.
222. See Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 7–35).
223. See Ind. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 681 (1856) (an act’s “subject must be reasonably particular
and not too general . . . .”); State v. Steinwedel, 180 N.E. 865, 868 (Ind. 1932) (citing Potts and
noting that “[t]his early case recognized that the only test which this court can apply is the indefinite
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on this ground, labeling it “indefinite” and concluding that section 19’s
“reasonableness nature” necessitates essentially absolute deference from the
courts on section 19 questions.224 The concept of “reasonableness,” however,
is nothing new to American law. Indeed, the notions of “reasonableness”
and “reasonableness tests” are so pervasive throughout our law as to be
deemed ubiquitous.225 More particularly, tests of reasonableness have been
invoked throughout Indiana’s constitutional law.226 Why Steinwedel
characterized section 19’s “reasonableness nature” as an insurmountable
problem is entirely unclear, for legal standards of “reasonableness” are firmly
rooted in American jurisprudence generally as well as in Indiana’s
constitutional thought.227

224.
225.

226.

227.

one of ‘reasonableness’. . . .”); see also Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 418 N.E.2d 207, 214 (Ind.
1981).
Steinwedel, 180 N.E. at 868.
By way of example, a brief perusal of American Jurisprudence reveals dozens of applications of
reasonableness and reasonableness tests throughout U.S. law. These include, for example, in the
law of contracts, the notions of “reasonable construction,” 17 AM.JUR.2d Contracts §§ 337–38
(2004), “reasonable disapproval of performance,” id. §§ 630–32, “reasonable effort,” id. § 602,
“reasonable time,” id. § 467, the “reasonable interpretation” of contracts, Id. §§ 337–38, the
“reasonable foreseeability” of damages, 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 305 (2003), and the use of
“reasonable” customs and usages in construing contract terms, 21A AM.JUR.2d Customs and
Usages § 9 (2008); and in the law of torts, the “reasonable person standard,” 57A AM.JUR.2d
Negligence § 7 (2004), “reasonableness” in comparative fault analysis, 57B AM.JUR.2d Negligence
§§ 970–71 (2004), and in the exercise of “reasonable care,” id. § 825.
See generally Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 2005) (holding that the legality of a
government search under the Indiana Constitution “turns on an evaluation of the reasonableness of
the police conduct under the totality of the circumstances”) (emphasis added); Collins v. Day, 644
N.E.2d 72, 78–79 (Ind. 1994) (holding that, in the context of Indiana’s privileges and immunities
clause of article I, section 23, where “the legislature singles out one person or class of persons to
receive a privilege or immunity not equally provided to others, such classification must be based
upon distinctive, inherent characteristics which rationally distinguish the unequally treated class,
and the disparate treatment accorded by the legislation must be reasonably related to such
distinguishing characteristics”) (emphasis added). In Municipal City of S. Bend v. Kimsey, 781
N.E.2d 683, 689 (Ind. 2003), the court held that the language of article IV, sections 22 and 23 did
not require a reasonableness test, but instead the language itself was sufficiently definitive so as to
provide a purely definitional test for questions of special and general legislation, in part because
“[t]he terms ‘general law’ and ‘special law’ have widely understood meanings.” The language of
section 19 is necessarily more akin to article I, section 23 (requiring a reasonableness test) than it
is to article IV, sections 22 and 23 (requiring no reasonableness test). See infra Part V.B.
Indeed, the courts routinely acknowledge the challenges inherent to reasonableness. In the criminal
context, for example, the court of appeals has observed that “probable cause is a fluid concept that
is incapable of precise definition” but that, nevertheless, “[p]robable cause is established where a
sufficient basis of fact exists to permit a reasonably prudent person to believe that a search of the
premises or person will uncover evidence of a crime.” Frensemeier v. State, 849 N.E.2d 157, 162
(Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citations omitted). Despite the fact that this fundamental legal concept cannot
be defined with precision, courts often apply the notion of probable cause. We do not throw out
probable cause jurisprudence because it eludes precise definition. Why single subject rule
jurisprudence should be any different is unclear. One might rejoinder that the single subject rule
implicates the function of another branch of government—but this does not seem persuasive.
Probable cause questions can lead to weighty criminal sanctions such as the death penalty or the
loss of a person’s freedom. The framers expressly intended that the courts would, one way or
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Nevertheless, modern courts have taken advantage of section 19’s
reasonableness nature to continue the doctrine of nearly-absolute
deference.228 Today, an act is invariably found to contain only “one subject
and matters properly connected therewith,”229 irrespective of its contents.
Most decisions have accomplished this by the two-part strategy of (1)
defining the act’s subject as broadly as necessary so that virtually any two
provisions can fit within the “subject,” and (2) characterizing, without
supporting analysis, those provisions still outside of the subject as being
“properly connected” to it. The first jurist to attack section 19 asserted that
“subjects are almost infinitely divisible,” and implied that this made section
19 questions exclusively a “legislative” issue,230 despite the framers’
uncontroverted intent to the contrary.231 With only the very rare exception,
the last hundred years of the decisional law has reflected this protocol.232
The case law’s approach to the single subject rule has defeated the
framers’ and ratifiers’ intent for this important provision. The framers
intended that “the courts will decide” section 19 questions.233 We have seen
that the framers intended single subject questions to be judicially cognizable.
It is equally important that the courts decide single subject disputes. By
“decide,” the framers did not mean that the courts would effectively
determine ahead of time to defer to whatever the legislature has done. Rather,
the framers had in mind the process of judicial decision-making to which
they were already accustomed: courts would craft a framework and would
apply the new legal standard to the facts of particular disputes on a case-bycase basis, without a pre-determined result in mind. Yet the case law has
embraced such a pre-determined result (namely, deference to the legislature
in all but a few rare cases). Some observers have recognized this over time
and have encouraged a more moderated single subject framework than that
of absolute deference.234
Other areas of the law (including constitutional law) routinely operate
under equally general doctrines. Few (if any) absolute rules of law can exist
in the context of a reasonableness test, but this has not slowed the ubiquity

228.
229.

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

another, actually enforce section 19. And a judicial finding of a lack of probable cause implicates
the functions of executive branch (law enforcement) officials.
See generally supra Part II.
This trend reached a zenith in the late twentieth century. One act, for example, was upheld despite
containing provisions as diverse as (1) the operation and jurisdiction of Indiana’s courts, and (2) the
Indiana Products Liability Law. See Evans v. Browne, 30 Ind. 514 (1869) (discussing the Dague
case).
See Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501, 553 (1855) (Gookins, J., dissenting) (although the nature of “a
subject” presents certain conceptual challenges, this does not render section 19 unenforceable.).
See Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 7–35).
See generally supra Part II.
See Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 28–29, 34–35).
See, e.g., Ind. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 681, 684 (1856) (an act’s “subject must be reasonably
particular and not too general . . . .”); see also infra Part V.
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of reasonableness throughout the law—nor should it.235 Like other tests of
“reasonableness,” section 19 demands not a series of absolute rules, but an
analytical architecture. The construction of such a framework is considered
below in Part V.
D. Other Roadblocks to Enforcement
The enrolled act rule and the standard of infinite reasonableness
represent the major hurdles to the enforcement of the single subject rule’s
procedural and substantive prongs, respectively. The removal of these
roadblocks would enable the courts to apply an analytical framework to
section 19 far better aligned with the framers’ intent than the prevailing
approach. However, even with the removal of these major roadblocks, other
minor (but potentially significant) objections have been, or could be, raised
to frustrate section 19’s enforcement. These are briefly considered below.
1. Issues of Original Intent
We have already noted that few Indiana appellate decisions consulted
the historical record to ascertain what the framers intended for the single
subject rule. Beyond this, section 19’s general phraseology invited
ideological opponents who favored unchecked legislative authority to
eviscerate the framers’ intent. Previous scholarship has undertaken a detailed
study of section 19’s meaning (and of the framers’ and ratifiers’ intentions in
creating it) in part to remove this difficulty.236 Uncertainties surrounding this
intent should no longer foreclose the creation of a workable single subject
framework.
2. Stare Decisis and Legislative Expectations
Any modification to Indiana’s single subject jurisprudence would
appear to offend the doctrine of stare decisis. Stare decisis, however, does
not prohibit the adoption of a revised single subject framework that is more
firmly rooted in the framers’ intent.
“The doctrine of stare decisis states that, when a court has once laid
down a principle of law as applicable to a certain set of facts, it will adhere
to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are
substantially the same.”237 However, “[p]recedence . . . can be no
justification for the continuance of an erroneous practice. Where judicial

235. See State v. Steinwedel, 180 N.E. 865, 868 (Ind. 1932).
236. See generally Evans & Bannister, supra note 1.
237. Emerson v. State, 812 N.E.2d 1090, 1099 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).

202

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 39

errors are apparent, they should be judicially corrected . . . .”238 We have
heretofore seen that the existing section 19 framework is inexorably and
unnecessarily conflicted with the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent, and is
therefore, by definition,239 an apparent judicial error. While “decisions
should be governed by precedent,” it is equally true that “when the reasons
for a rule of law cease to exist, the rule should be discontinued. When the
question is properly raised, it is the duty of the court to investigate the
wisdom of precedents established many years ago.”240 In light of what is
now known about the framers’ intent,241 the courts are justified in revising
the existing section 19 framework.
These principles are particularly compelling in the area of constitutional
law. The Indiana Supreme Court has observed that
[t]he rule of stare decisis has not been held to apply with its usual force and
vigor to decisions upon constitutional questions . . . “The rule of stare
decisis [does not apply] to questions involving the construction and
interpretation of the organic law, the structure of the government, and the
limitations upon the legislative and executive power.”242

Resistance to a new single subject framework may be grounded in the
legislature’s historical and contemporary reliance upon the existing rule of
absolute deference. But the law’s default presumption is that new
constitutional pronouncements will be applied prospectively: “[a] newlyannounced constitutional principle will not be given retroactive effect . . .
unless it is plainly and unequivocally made retroactive by the supreme
court.”243 Endorsing the single subject rule’s enforcement, Justice Brent
Dickson has urged, in a noteworthy dissent, that a new, enforceable
framework be applied only on a prospective basis.244 Thus, the legislature’s
historical expectation of section 19’s non-enforcement carries no weight in
the question of its future enforcement. Beyond this, neither the legislature
nor the executive branch expects the courts to be infallible, and, as with the
conduct of their own affairs, neither branch would expect the courts to refuse

238. Martin v. State, 480 N.E.2d 543, 548 (Ind. 1985) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
239. See Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 1–4 and cases cited therein) (noting that the
framers’ and ratifiers’ intent is the paramount authority as to the meaning of a constitutional
provision).
240. Morton v. Merrillville Toyota, Inc., 562 N.E.2d 781 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted).
241. See generally Evans & Bannister, supra note 1.
242. Robinson v. Schenck, 1 N.E. 698, 706 (Ind. 1885) (quoting Willis v. Owen, 43 Tex. 41, 49 (1875))
(emphasis added); accord Denney v. State, 42 N.E. 929, 940 (Ind. 1896) (“it will not be considered
that the rule of stare decisis requires that, in deciding so grave a matter as that of the constitutionality
of an act of the legislature, we should be bound by even our own former decisions”).
243. 7 IND. LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA, Courts § 36 (2008).
244. Pence v. State, 652 N.E.2d 486, 489–90 (Ind. 1995) (Dickson, J., dissenting).
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corrective action once a rule’s erroneousness or obsolescence becomes
apparent.
Because stare decisis does not apply with its usual force to
constitutional questions, and because a new framework would apply only to
future acts, the courts should not feel obligated to retain the shortcomings of
the present single subject jurisprudence.
3. Majority Rule and the Presumption of Constitutionality
As to claims arising under the constitution generally, it remains true that
statutes are “presumed constitutional; a challenger must rebut this
presumption.”245 Yet this presumption is not effectively absolute; it is instead
realistically rebuttable. The test thus far used to evaluate section 19 questions
has morphed into such a barrier that virtually any combination of items in an
act will be upheld.246 As many cases have phrased it, a “statute is
presumptively valid and will not be overthrown as unconstitutional if it can
be sustained on any reasonable basis.”247 The difficulty with the existing
section 19 framework is the unreasonableness of absolute (or near-absolute)
deference, on account of its irreconcilability with the framers’ intent.
Upholding statutes by defining their subjects so broadly that any two items
may be included is not “reasonable.” The existing framework’s definition of
“any reasonable basis”—namely, whatever the legislature happens to do—is
illusory because it is not grounded in the framers’ intent.
The framework below proposes an alternative to near-absolute
deference. A bona fide reasonableness test, grounded in the framers’ intent,
will best serve the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent (and will vindicate those
interests of society that animated the rule’s inclusion to begin with). Indeed,
the entire notion of reasonableness necessarily rejects both (1) the position
that no laws except the most obvious and egregious instances of invalidity
can be found in violation of section 19 (the common law’s present stance)
and (2) the position that acts will frequently be voided on overly technical
grounds (what the decisional law incorrectly presents as the only alternative
to absolute deference). The framers did not intend to stack the deck so
heavily in favor of legislative acts that future courts would void them only
when the challenger presented the perfect case of its unconstitutionality.
Instead, the framers intended that courts would forcefully give effect to

245. McManus v. State, 814 N.E.2d 253, 255 (Ind. 2004).
246. By way of example in Indiana, every single subject challenge since section 19’s amendment has
been rejected in pro forma fashion, applying the standard of absolute deference. See supra Part
II.A.3 (discussing Indiana’s twentieth-century treatment of the single subject rule).
247. Book v. State Office Bldg. Com., 149 N.E.2d 273, 280 (Ind. 1958) (emphasis added).
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article IV’s restrictions, so that they would not become empty words in
practice.248
By definition, the judicial act of voiding a statute thwarts the will of a
legislative majority. Courts must be cautious in overturning a statute on
constitutional grounds. However, there is nothing unique about this principle
in the section 19 context. Many cases have explained that while the majority
generally rules in our legal system, this rule is not absolute.249
Notwithstanding the presumption of constitutionality, the legislature still
“must regulate within the restrictions of the constitution.”250 Otherwise
stated, “[t]he majority rules when all act within the limits of the
constitution.”251 The presumption of deference is not (or, in the case of
section 19, ought not to be) absolute. The courts “only attempt to confine
that of the legislature within the limits the people, by their fundamental law,
assigned to it,” and “[i]f those limits are unsatisfactory, the fault is of the
constitution, not of” the courts.252
The presumption of validity and the notion of majority rule are sound.
But neither concept can operate to trump the framers’ intent that
reasonableness, as they understood it, would define the framework for testing
acts for compliance with the single subject rule. In the context of section 19,
the presumption of validity has morphed into a veritably automatic finding
of validity. In so doing, it has inhibited the establishment of a bona fide
reasonableness test.
4. Standing
Though seldom invoked, this potential ground for defeating single
subject challenges merits brief consideration. Justice Brent Dickson’s view
on standing should be adopted;253 specifically, the public standing doctrine
should operate to empower interested citizens to challenge statutory
enactments on the basis of constitutional infringement. “Where public rather
than private rights are at issue, the usual requirements for establishing
standing need not be met.”254 A lack of standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the legislature’s acts is inconsistent with the idea that “all
power is inherent in the People” such that “the People have, at all times, an
indefeasible right to alter and reform their government.”255

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

See infra Part III.D.6.
See, e.g., Madison & Indianapolis R.R. Co. v. Whiteneck, 8 Ind. 217, 231–32 (1856).
Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501, 518 (1855).
Whiteneck, 8 Ind. at 231 (emphasis added).
Id. at 232.
See Pence v. State, 652 N.E.2d 486, 489 (Ind. 1995) (Dickson, J., dissenting).
Id.
IND. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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5. The Difficulty of an Alternative
Crafting an alternative to the existing single subject framework is
undoubtedly challenging and, like virtually every other constitutional
provision, will require the benefit of evolving over time in the case law. The
formation of such an alternative will be challenging both intellectually (for
the reasons observed above) and politically (out of concern that the
legislature will react adversely should the courts begin enforcing the single
subject rule). As for the intellectual challenge, the single subject rule, like
other difficult constitutional questions, will develop with time and effort. As
for the political challenge, we have already observed that most legislators
would appreciate the judicial enforcement of the single subject rule.256 The
legislature’s response to the Court’s decision in State ex rel. Pearcy v.
Criminal Court of Marion County257 is illustrative. Pearcy voided, not
merely an act but the entire Indiana Code.258 The legislature responded by
amending the Constitution (with the public’s approval).259 There followed no
assault upon the integrity of the courts; the public would not tolerate such a
response. The courts must not fail to adopt a functional single subject
framework on the basis of the anticipated difficulties—real or imagined—of
arriving at a new jurisprudence.
6. Recent Views
The Indiana Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on the single
subject rule is found in the 2012 case of Loparex, LLC v. MPI Release
Technologies.260 Loparex sued two of its former employees, accusing the
former employees of violating their non-compete agreements and of taking
trade secrets to MPI, their new employer.261 One of these former employees
had voluntarily resigned from Loparex and thereafter went to work for
MPI.262 The former employees counterclaimed, asserting that Loparex had
attempted to get them fired from MPI by offering to drop its lawsuit if MPI

256. See Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 41 n.244) (noting the views of a former Indiana
legislator, and the sponsor of the 1974 amendment to section 19, that legislators disfavor being
forced to vote for items they oppose in order to achieve the passage of items they favor, which
situation often prevails in the absence of the courts’ enforcement of section 19). See also supra
note 120 (observing that both chambers of the Indiana Legislature have incorporated this notion in
their rules).
257. 274 N.E.2d 519 (Ind. 1971).
258. Id.
259. Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at X).
260. 964 N.E.2d 806 (Ind. 2012).
261. Id. at 809–10.
262. Id. at 810.
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agreed to fire them.263 The former employees claimed that Loparex’s attempt
to get them fired was a violation of Indiana’s Blacklisting Statute.264
Because one of the former employees had left Loparex voluntarily to
join MPI,265 the question arose as to whether an individual who voluntarily
leaves employment is entitled to bring a claim under Indiana’s Blacklisting
Statute.266 In the 1904 case of Wabash Railroad Co. v. Young,267 the Indiana
Supreme Court had held a portion of Indiana’s Blacklisting Statute
unconstitutional as a violation of the single subject rule.268 The Blacklisting
Statute’s text provides a cause of action to discharged employees, as well as
to “employees who may have voluntarily left said company’s service.” 269
Looking to the title of the Blacklisting Statute, which read “An act for the
protection of discharged employees and to prevent blacklisting,”270 the Young
Court determined that the subject of the act was “the protection of discharged
employees.”271 The Young Court “concluded that this subject did not
encompass ‘protection of employees who have not been discharged, or who
voluntarily quit the service of their employer,’”272 and, thus, the Court held
as void the portion of the statute providing a cause of action for workers who
voluntarily leave their previous employer.273
The Loparex Court first observed that the language of section 19 was
still in its original iteration when Young was decided in 1904.274 At that time,
section 19 declared that
[e]very act shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected
therewith; which shall be expressed in the title. But if any subject shall be
embraced in an act, which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall
be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in the title. 275

The contemporary version of section 19, under which Loparex was
decided, reads: “An act, except an act for the codification, revision or
rearrangement of laws, shall be confined to one subject and matters properly
connected therewith.”276 The Loparex Court then noted that under today’s
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 809.
69 N.E. 1003 (Ind. 1904).
Id.
Loparex, 964 N.E.2d at 812.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also IND. CONST. art. IV, § 19 (1851 version).
IND. CONST. art. IV, § 19.
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version of section 19, “the single subject [rule] is no longer tethered to the
act’s title,”277 and, as a result, the analytical process for evaluating questions
arising under section 19 has changed since Young was decided.278 (On this
ground, the Loparex Court overruled Young, concluding that Indiana’s
Blacklisting Statute does not violate the single subject rule, and that
employees who voluntarily leave their employment do enjoy a cause of
action under the law today.)279
Of greater interest to us is Loparex’s discussion of the single subject
rule itself. Loparex retained and relied upon many of the precedents that this
article has attempted to show are inconsistent with the framers’ and ratifiers’
intent.280 For instance, the Loparex Court noted that “we continue to apply
[a] liberal construction [from precedents such as Dague] when analyzing
statutes against section 19 as it is written today.”281 Acknowledging that this
approach “has often been favorable to the legislature’s enactments,”282 the
court then declared that its precedents “did not leave section 19 a dead
letter.”283 Yet whether the court’s current framework for single subject
analysis has left the rule literally a dead letter, or merely very nearly a dead
letter, this is not the best benchmark against which the current framework can
be assessed. A better standard is the degree to which the current framework
approximates and effectuates the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent for the single
subject rule.284
The Loparex Court rightly observed that “the indefinite test of
‘reasonableness,’ rather than a structured bright-line rule,” must be applied
to the single subject rule.285 But this does not mean that any “reasonableness
test” is appropriate for the single subject context: “[a] constitutional
provision must never be construed in such a manner as to make it possible

277. Loparex, 964 N.E.2d at 813.
278. Id. at 809; see also Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 40–42) (discussing the
implications for single subject analysis under the current language as opposed to the original
language).
279. Loparex, 964 N.E.2d at 815.
280. See generally supra Parts II & III.
281. Loparex, 964 N.E.2d at 813; see also Dague v. Piper Aircraft Co, 418 N.E.2d 207, 214–15 (Ind.
1981) (finding that “the title of the act specifically mentions the subject matter of section twentyeight” such that no one could be deceived as to the location of a provision of the act).
282. Loparex, 964 N.E.2d at 813.
283. Id. at 814.
284. 16 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 78, § 63 (“In interpreting a constitutional provision, the court’s primary
purpose is to effectuate the intent of both those who framed the provision and those who adopted
or voted for the provision.”); see also Embry v. O’Bannon, 798 N.E.2d 157, 160 (Ind. 2003) (noting
this rule in Indiana).
285. Loparex, 964 N.E.2d at 814; accord State ex rel. Test v. Steinwedel, 180 N.E. 180 N.E. 865, 868
(Ind. 1932) (noting that a test of reasonableness is indeed the only viable measure for single subject
analysis) and infra Part V (proposing a more precisely defined reasonableness test for single subject
rule analysis grounded in the clear intent of the framers and ratifiers).
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for the will of the people to be frustrated or denied.”286 Among the many
principles that should guide single subject analysis today, is the framers’ and
ratifiers’ unmistakable intent that the rule be included in the 1851
Constitution for the specific purpose of limiting the legislature’s discretion
in the process of statutory creation;287 that the single subject rule, entirely
apart from the title requirement, embodies both a procedural prohibition
against logrolling and a substantive prohibition against multi-subject acts;288
that the courts would rigorously enforce the rule;289 and that the prevailing
guides for single subject analysis—the enrolled act rule and the doctrine of
infinite reasonableness—are affirmatively and deeply conflicted with the
framers’ and ratifiers’ intent,290 and have indeed “[made] it possible for the
will of the people to be frustrated or denied.”291 Loparex did little to
substantiate the courts’ continuing reliance upon the enrolled act rule and
doctrine of infinite reasonableness:292 although the title requirement is no
longer solely determinative of an act’s subject (since the 1974 amendment
removed the title requirement from section 19 altogether), Loparex did not
acknowledge that the 1974 amendment preserved the framers’ and ratifiers’
intent.293 In other words, the mere fact that section 19 was amended in 1974
did not erase the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent for the single subject rule, and
the amendment was not intended to further the long line of precedents upon
which Loparex relied in continuing the enrolled act rule and doctrine of
infinite reasonableness.294
To summarize, the principal authorities throughout which the
contemporary single subject test evolved were developed with little or no
attempt to discern the framers’ and ratifiers’ actual intent. As a result,
Indiana’s contemporary single subject test is affirmatively conflicted with the
286.
287.
288.
289.

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

16 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 78, § 63.
Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 4–7).
Id. (manuscript at 33–34).
Id. (manuscript at 28–29, 34–35). In so doing, the courts must define an act’s subject with
“reasonable specificity.” See Ind. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 681, 685 (1856). Of the many
precedents it cited in summarizing contemporary single subject analysis, Loparex made no mention
of “reasonable specificity” or of Potts.
See generally Evans & Bannister, supra note 1; see also generally supra Parts II & III.
See supra note 269 (reciting this standard).
See generally Loparex, 964 N.E.2d 806.
Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 40–42).
“In the years since 1909,” the Court noted, “a good many cases analyzing challenges to statutes
under section 19 have employed a more accommodating approach than that taken in Young.”
Loparex, 964 N.E.2d at 813. Yet to the extent the cases alluded to deviated from the framers’ and
ratifiers’ intent, they, too, are lacking. See generally Evans & Bannister, supra note 1; see also
generally supra Parts II & III. Although the single subject rule and title requirements remained
separate provisions, each with their own purposes, Indiana’s case law often conflated the two. See
Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 43–44 nn.250–55 and accompanying text); see also
supra Part III.A (discussing this topic). But there is no doubt that the present version of the single
subject rule continues to embody, and ought to be defined by, the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent.
Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 40–42).
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framers’ and ratifiers’ intent. A better test or framework within which to
analyze single subject questions can be devised—one that is firmly grounded
in this intent. Part V, infra, considers the parameters of such a framework.
First, however, we turn to the question of how the other 40 single subject
states have treated single subject analysis. We will see that the courts of most
of the other single subject states are as deferential to legislative action as is
Indiana, although some encouraging trends are evident.
IV. SINGLE SUBJECT TESTS ACROSS THE STATES
Although the decisional law across the states may vary somewhat in its
phraseology and application, it appears that most single subject states have
adopted the same general line of common law principles as those now
prevailing in Indiana.295 For instance, many of the single subject states hold
that “[i]n determining whether a bill is confined to one subject . . . [a]ll that
is necessary is that the act should embrace some one general subject.”296 Just
how general a “general subject” may be varies, but most often this generality
is defined as any “logical” or “natural” connection among the parts of the act,
or between the subject and each part of the act.297 Several states stretch this
standard such that the constituent parts of an act need not even directly bear
a connection to the subject, but may instead be upheld by sharing “indirect”
connections to the act’s subject.298 Even matters that appear to constitute
distinct, separate subjects will be upheld in some states “unless they are
incongruous and diverse to each other.”299
Similarly, many states hold that the single subject rule is to be construed
with “liberality” or “considerable breadth.”300 This standard is commonly
explained by asserting that the single subject rule was intended to address
only “flagrant evils” or violations that are “substantial,” or “gross and
fraudulent.”301 Some courts have even held, contrary to the plain language
295. See supra Parts II & III (detailing Indiana’s common law treatment of the single subject rule); see
also infra Part IV (discussing the common law’s treatment of the single subject rule in the other
single subject states).
296. Short v. State, 600 P.2d 20, 24 (Alaska 1979).
297. See, e.g., Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475, 485 (La. 1981); Silver City Consol. Sch. Dist. v.
Board of Regents, 401 P.2d 95, 110 (N.M. 1965); Boise City v. Baxter, 238 P. 1029, 1032 (Idaho
1925).
298. See, e.g., Robinson v. Hill, 507 S.W.2d 521, 524–25 (Tex. 1974); Merchants’ Nat’l Bank v. Dawson
Cnty., 19 P.2d 892, 900 (Mont. 1933); Pioneer Irrigation Dist. v. Bradbury, 68 P. 295, 297 (Idaho
1902).
299. Clendaniel v. Conrad, 83 A. 1036, 1042 (Del. 1912).
300. See, e.g., Brinegar v. Clark, 371 P.2d 62, 66 (Wyo. 1962) (single subject rule “must be liberally and
reasonably construed”); Gellert v. State, 522 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Alaska 1974) (rule must be
“construed with considerable breadth”).
301. See, e.g., Beagle v. Walden, 676 N.E.2d 506, 507 (Ohio 1997) (a finding that the legislature violated
the single subject rule “is proper only when a violation of the rule is manifestly gross and
fraudulent”); Schwab v. Ariyoshi, 564 P.2d 135, 139 (Haw. 1977) (in order to void an act, the
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of the rule, that acts may contain more than one subject.302 These lines of
authority are usually premised upon minimizing judicial involvement in
legislative functions303—a legitimate sentiment in the general constitutional
sense, but one that was intended not to hold with the usual force with respect
to the single subject rule.
Of course, as we have seen, the simple requirement of a “general
subject” and the notion of “great liberality” are at odds with the standard of
reasonable specificity.304 Some states have recognized a limit to these
doctrines. Wisconsin’s courts, for instance, have declared that the single
subject rule is an important constitutional restriction upon the legislative
power; that those who object to enforcement of the rule as a mere technicality
misconceive the rule and its purpose; and that the courts must enforce the
rule, as it is mandatory and binding upon the legislature.305 Other states
mitigate the rule of “liberal construction”306 while others observe a strict
construction for their single subject rules, some of which acknowledge that
the legislature can regularly defeat the constitutional mandate when courts
apply a liberal construction.307 For many states, then, the question thus

302.

303.

304.
305.
306.

307.

legislature’s single subject violation must be “plain, clear, manifest, and unmistakable”); Brinegar
v. Clark, 371 P.2d 62, 66 (Wyo. 1962) (“All that is necessary for compliance with this provision of
the constitution is a reasonable adherence thereto.”); Sullivan v. Siegal, 245 P.2d 860, 863 (Colo.
1952) (single subject rule to guard against “flagrant evils connected with the adoption of laws”).
See, e.g., Boise City, 238 P. at 1032 (holding that “a single act may embrace many subjects and not
be duplicitous, if they pertain to matters that are properly connected with the subject of the act”).
This position results in a logical contradiction. See Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at
24 n.140 and accompanying text).
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Swoap, 173 Cal. App. 3d 1187, 1196 (1985) (single
subject rule to be construed liberally so as to minimize judicial involvement with legislature); State
v. Gulf States Theatres, Inc., 270 So. 2d 547, 554 (La. 1972) (“The title of an act must be broadly
construed with a view to effectuating, not frustrating, the legislative purpose.”). Stating the test this
way undercuts the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent for the rule: the intent was not that the courts would
either effectuate or frustrate the legislature per se, but instead that the courts would serve as a
bulwark against logrolling. See generally Evans & Bannister, supra note 1.
The standard of “reasonable specificity” was first propounded in Ind. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind.
681, 685 (1856), and is incorporated into the framework proposed here, see infra Part V.
See generally Durkee v. Janesville, 26 Wis. 697 (1870).
See, e.g., State ex rel. Davis v. Woolley, 92 A.2d 600, 602 (Del. 1952) (“While [the single subject
and title provision] is to be construed liberally in an effort to uphold legislation, liberality in
construction should not be carried to an extreme that verges on emasculation.”); Bd. of Penitentiary
Comm’rs v. Spencer, 166 S.W. 1017, 1018 (Ky. 1914) (“[t]he section should be liberally construed
so as not to hinder or embarrass the Legislature in its efforts to enact laws, but at the same time a
construction so loose as to virtually nullify the section, which is mandatory in its terms, should not
be adopted.”); State v. Payne, 295 P. 770, 772 (Nev. 1931) (“[t]he rule of liberal
construction . . . cannot be extended to the point of nullification . . . . ”); Pa. State Ass’n of Jury
Comm’rs v. Commonwealth, 64 A.3d 611, 614 (Pa. 2013) (“no proposed unifying scheme can be
‘so broad as to stretch ‘the concept of a single topic beyond the breaking point’ or ‘encompas[s] a
limitless number of subjects’’”).
See, e.g., Douglas v. Cox Retirement Props., Inc., 302 P.3d 789, 792 (Okla. 2013); accord Montana
Auto. Ass’n v. Greely, 632 P.2d 300, 311 (Mont. 1981). An older Kentucky case illustrates one
approach, holding that “although a title may begin with a generally designated subject which is
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becomes “at what point does a ‘liberal construction’ verge on emasculating
the single subject rule?” This Article submits that the answer is straightforward: any framework or test for single subject analysis that demonstrably
frustrates or defeats the clear intent of the framers and ratifiers has, by
definition, emasculated the single subject rule.308
Yet this is not how most states have approached their single subject
rules. Most have defined their single subject tests in very broad and vague
language, calculated to defer to the legislature.309 Georgia’s test is
representative: “The test of whether an Act or a constitutional amendment
violates the multiple subject matter rule is whether all of the parts of the Act
or of the constitutional amendment are germane to the accomplishment of a
single objective.”310 Often, these tests declare that an act comports to the
single subject rule so long as all of the provisions in the act share a “natural
connection,” or are “reasonably related” to one another or to the subject of
the act.311 The issue then becomes what “natural connection” really means.
In practice, it appears to mean only that the courts will defer to the
legislature’s act.312
A few states offer somewhat greater detail in their single subject tests,
sometimes in recognition of the fact that single subject frameworks over time
have lacked clarity and consistency.313 Some, such as Utah, have articulated

308.
309.

310.

311.

312.
313.

broad enough to justify the provisions of the act relating thereto, yet if this is followed by restrictive
language curtailing the scope of such general designation and in such form as to confine the title to
legislation within the restrictions only, then the body of the act may go no further than authorized
by the restrictive language.” Jefferson County Fiscal Court v. Thomas, 130 S.W.2d 60, 65 (Ky.
1939). This reasoning says in effect that the legislature may define the subject of each act as
generally as it likes, but if it chooses to define the act’s subject narrowly, then the act’s provisions
will have to be more tightly connected. This reading of the rule, which allows (and indeed
incentivizes) the legislature to define the subjects of acts as broadly as one can imagine, defeats the
framers’ intent; it tells the legislature that it will have to worry about being held to the single subject
rule only if it chooses to define the subject narrowly. See infra note 321 and accompanying text.
See infra Part V.
Even those commentators who oppose a “stricter” construction of the single subject rule concede
that the more liberal standard “has a weak conceptual foundation.” See Daniel H. Lowenstein,
California Initiatives and the Single-Subject Rule, 30 UCLA L. REV. 936, 938 (1983).
Wall v. Bd. of Elections, 250 S.E.2d 408, 413 (Ga. 1978) (quoting Carter v. Burson, 198 S.E.2d
151, 156 (Ga. 1973)); accord Sunbehm Gas, Inc. v. Conrad, 310 N.W.2d 766, 772 (N.D. 1981);
Caldwell v. Harris, 204 S.W.2d 1019, 1021 (Tenn. 1947).
See, e.g., State v. Huntley, 658 P.2d 1246, 1247 (Wash. 1983) (rational unity needed between act’s
subject and its provisions); State v. Cooper, 382 So.2d 963, 965 (La. 1980) (statute’s provisions
must have a natural connection and reasonably relate to act’s subject); Buhl v. Joint Indep. Consol.
Sch. Dist., 82 N.W.2d 836, 839 (Minn. 1957) (to violate the single subject rule, “an act must
embrace two or more dissimilar and discordant subjects which cannot reasonably be said to have
any legitimate connection.”); Jefferson Cnty. Fiscal Court v. Thomas, 130 S.W.2d 60, 64 (Ky. 1939)
(provisions must have a natural connection with the act’s subject).
See generally supra Parts II-IV.
See, e.g., Pa. State Ass’n of Jury Comm’rs v. Commonwealth, 64 A.3d 611, 616 (Pa. 2013) (noting
that in Pennsylvania, “by 2003, germaneness had evolved to a standard of ‘whether the court can
fashion a single, over-arching topic to loosely relate the various subjects included in the statute
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several discrete (but nevertheless general) parameters for single subject
analysis.314 Other states provide more specific steps in the analysis. In
Florida, for example, “the first step in determining whether legislation
violates the single subject rule is to determine the single subject,” and this is
usually the subject expressed in the act’s title.315
The second step in single subject review requires an analysis of the
provisions of the law to determine whether they are ‘properly connected’
to this single subject. A provision is ‘properly connected’ to the subject
‘(1) if the connection is natural or logical, or (2) if there is a reasonable
explanation for how the provision is (a) necessary to the subject or (b)
tends to make effective or promote the objects and purposes of legislation
included in the subject.’316

Similarly, Illinois employs a two-part test in which courts first
“determine whether the act, on its face, involves a legitimate single subject,”
and then “discern whether the various provisions within an act all relate to
the proper subject at issue.”317 Oregon’s appellate guidance is also helpful to
its lower courts:
[T]he appropriate analysis of a one-subject challenge to the body of an act,
made under Article IV, section 20, should proceed in these steps: (1)
Examine the body of the act to determine whether (without regard to an
examination of the title) the court can identify a unifying principle logically
connecting all provisions in the act, such that it can be said that the act
“embrace[s] but one subject.” (2) If the court has not identified a unifying
principle logically connecting all provisions in the act, examine the title of
the act with reference to the body of the act. In a one-subject challenge to
the body of an act, the purpose of that examination is to determine whether
the legislature nonetheless has identified, and expressed in the title, such a
unifying principle logically connecting all provisions in the act, thereby
demonstrating that the act, in fact, “embrace[s] but one subject.”318

314.

315.
316.
317.
318.

under review.’ . . . Nevertheless, we cautioned that we should be careful not to render section 3
‘impotent to guard against the evils that it was designed to curtail’ by fashioning a theme that is allencompassing in its broadness.”); McIntire v. Forbes, 909 P.2d 846, 853–54 (Or. 1996) (noting that
“[t]he Oregon appellate courts have adjudicated at least 90 cases under article IV, section 20 . . .
The cases are not always clear or consistent in analytical approach.”).
State v. McCornish, 201 P. 637, 638–39 (Utah 1921) (explaining that the single subject rule must
be literally construed so as not to hamper the legislature, that the rule must guard against the evils
that inspired it, and that no bright-line guidance for the rule can be formulated beyond general
benchmarks).
Whitsett v. State, 913 So.2d 1208, 1211 (Fla. 2005).
Id.
People v. Burdunice, 811 N.E.2d 678, 681 (Ill. 2004).
McIntire v. Forbes, 909 P.2d 846, 856 (Or. 1996).
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Even these more detailed single subject tests leave open the question of “how
do we know what is reasonable?” We have noted already that most single
subject states lack direct evidence of what their framers and ratifiers intended
for their respective single subject rules; nevertheless, most states express
fidelity to this intent in the process of constitutional interpretation and
implementation.319 Indiana, which enjoys an extensive historical record
concerning its framers’ and ratifiers’ intent for the single subject rule (and
which intent has been thoroughly assessed both here320 and in our prior
work),321 could serve well as a reliable persuasive precedent for the other
single subject states.322 To that end, Part V considers an alternative
constitutional framework for the analysis of single subject claims—a
framework explicitly grounded in the prescient guidance of Indiana framers
and ratifiers.
V. A NEW JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Known Constraints
The construction of a revised single subject framework should begin by
defining the parameters within which the new framework should operate.
For guidance, Part V primarily (but not exclusively) references the Indiana
framers’ and ratifiers’ intentions for the single subject rule, as well as the
necessary implications gleaned from this article and from our prior work on
this topic.323 These parameters are, at a minimum, as follows:




319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

The major impetus for calling Indiana’s 1850 Convention was the
reform (and restriction) of the legislative branch. 324 This was not
simply to be done in theory, as the Indiana framers were practical and
sought restrictions that would function in practice.325
The two principal purposes of the single subject rule are to prevent
logrolling (a procedural goal) and to prevent incongruous items, with
little reasonable connection, from being joined in the same bill (a
substantive goal). The single subject rule thus contains a procedural
prong as well as a substantive prong.326

See supra Part I.
See generally supra Parts II-IV.
See generally Evans & Bannister, supra note 1.
See supra Part I.
See generally Evans & Bannister, supra note 1. Because Indiana’s historical record is probably the
most extensive among the single subject states, the new framework proposed here could likely be
adopted throughout the single subject jurisdictions. See supra notes 303–05 and accompanying
text.
324. Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 4–7).
325. Id. (manuscript at 29) (discussing the framers’ intent that the rule would function in practice).
326. Id. (manuscript at 33–34).
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The plain language of the single subject rule establishes the
mandatory requirement that acts must be confined to one subject and
to subsets of that subject.327
The single subject rule is to be enforced. More particularly, Indiana’s
framers intended that the single subject rule would be enforced by
legislative and executive leadership and, if needed, by the courts.328
This means that the single subject rule is not self-enforcing, but is
instead judicially cognizable.329 Determining an act’s compliance
with the single subject rule is not a “legislative function;” rather, it is
a “judicial question.”330
The separation of powers doctrine thus creates no barriers to the
judicial enforcement of the single subject rule.331
Those delegates opposed to section 19 at Indiana’s 1850
Constitutional Convention asserted that the single subject rule was
unnecessary and superfluous; that it would obstruct effective
legislative functioning; that the rule would require judicial
involvement; and that the rule would be unworkable in practice. The
Convention majority considered and rejected these concerns,
rendering them illegitimate barriers to the single subject rule’s
enforcement today.332
The framers understood logrolling much like we do today, as the
combination of two or more unrelated items for the purpose of passing
both when either (1) the two provisions standing alone would not
accumulate sufficient support for passage individually, or (2) the
legislature finds it inconvenient to debate, discuss and scrutinize each
provision separately.333
The phrase “matters properly connected therewith” does not mean
“additional subjects,” but instead indicates that the courts should not
void laws based upon technical flaws in their titles. Matters properly
connected must be a subset of the act’s subject.334
A functional, sound framework for single subject analysis must be
based upon a reasonableness test designed to effectuate the framers’
intent for each of the single subject rule’s prongs, procedural and
substantive.335

327. See IND. CONST. art. IV, § 19. See also Evans & Bannister, supra note 1, at 20–25 (discussing the
“matters properly connected phrase” as a subset of the act’s subject).
328. Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 28-29, 34–35).
329. Id.; see also supra Parts II.A.1 & III.B.3.
330. Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 28-29, 34–35); see also supra Part III.B.3.
331. See supra Part III.B.
332. Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 25–30).
333. Id. (manuscript at 12, 45–46); see also supra note 99.
334. Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 20–25).
335. See supra notes 31–32 & 89, and accompanying text.
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Although acts are presumed constitutional, this presumption cannot
be so overwhelming as to trump the framers’ intent. 336 The current
jurisprudence in most states defeats the framers’ intent by refusing to
consider the single subject rule’s procedural prong altogether and by
eviscerating the substantive prong by defining the act’s subject so
broadly that virtually any two items can be included under it. 337
The subject of an act must necessarily be defined with “reasonable
specificity;” otherwise, the framers’ intent is defeated and the rule’s
entire purpose is lost.338
An act found to contain more than one subject may be voided in its
entirety, or may be voided only as to those provisions falling outside
of the subject.339

With these restrictions in mind, we next consider what the beginnings of a
new single subject framework might look like.
B. The Reasonableness Spectrum, Judicial Activism, and the Case for the
Centrist Approach
As discussed below,340 crafting a test or framework for section 19’s
procedural prong is relatively simple: once the enrolled act rule is removed,
litigants will be at liberty to prove by evidence (including the legislature’s
journals) whether or not logrolling occurred. It is the single subject rule’s
substantive prong—the prohibition against an act containing more than one
subject—for which the development of a framework is more challenging.
336. Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 2 n.5); see also supra Part IV (citing numerous
authorities supporting this proposition).
337. See generally supra Parts II & III.
338. See supra notes 31–32 & 89, and accompanying text. Some courts have affirmatively incentivized
the legislature to defeat the purpose of the rule by noting that general titles are more likely to be
constitutional than specific titles. See, e.g., Swedish Hosp. of Seattle v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus.,
176 P.2d 429, 435 (Wash. 1947).
339. Many states that have retained both the single subject rule and the title requirement find that a multisubject act is void only as to those provisions falling outside of the subject defined in the title. See,
e.g., Associated Builders & Contractors v. Ventura, 610 N.W.2d 293, 304-05 (Minn. 2000)
(discussing this topic with respect to Minnesota’s single subject rule); McCamey v. Cummings, 172
S.W. 311, 313–14 (Tenn. 1914). This was once the rule in Indiana, before the 1974 amendment
that eliminated the title requirement. See, e.g., Wabash R.R. Co. v. Young, 69 N.E. 1003 (Ind.
1904). Since Indiana’s single subject provision is no longer tied to the title requirement, however,
it is likely that the whole act must be declared void, once two or more provisions pertaining to
separate subjects have been identified. See Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 19
n.108); see also, e.g., Am. Petroleum Inst. v. S.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 677 S.E.2d 16, 19-20 (S.C.
2009) (holding that “to sever only part of the unconstitutional act would require this Court to go
beyond its proper role and to intrude into the province of the legislature,” and, thus, the Court was
“constrained to find the entire Act violative of” the single subject rule); Whitlock v. Hawkins, 53
S.E. 401, 402 (Va. 1906) (“We concede that, if an act embraces two subjects, the entire act must be
declared void . . . .”).
340. See infra Part V.C.2.
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Our task is to discern what type of framework would fill the vacuum if the
existing jurisprudence—near-absolute deference through infinite
reasonableness—was to be renounced.
In answering this we must first consider two important preliminary
issues, beginning with the tension between two of the earliest competing
visions for the single subject rule.341 Indiana’s record is helpful on this point.
In his dissent in Beebe v. State, Judge Gookins, an opponent of the single
subject rule, observed that “subjects are almost infinitely divisible.”342
Gookins implied that this fact made the single subject rule unenforceable in
practice. This view was contested by Judge Perkins in Potts, where the court
held that the “subject must be reasonably particular and not too general; for
otherwise the object of the constitutional provision would be wholly
thwarted.”343
Just how one defines or characterizes the subject of an act is crucial.
Gookins was correct when he observed that the subject of an act might be
characterized in any number of ways, with varying degrees of generality to
specificity. But he was wrong to declare that this feature renders the single
subject rule unenforceable: the rule’s purposes can be effectuated only if the
act’s subject is defined with reasonable specificity.
Resolving these differences suggests a “reasonableness spectrum”
along which we can plot both (1) the degree of specificity with which the
subjects of acts must be defined and (2) the reasonableness of the courts
themselves in applying the single subject rule. The later of these is a direct
function of the first: a reasonable framework will make for the reasonable
application of the single subject rule.
The reasonableness spectrum is perhaps best represented visually:

341. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing these cases).
342. 6 Ind. 501, 553 (1855).
343. Ind. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 681 (1856)
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The Reasonableness Spectrum
Breadth

Specificity

Increasingly greater specificity in defining
subjects is required as we slide right,
and higher numbers of acts are voided
on the basis of the substantive prong.

Here, subjects are permitted to be characterized
so broadly that virtually no act can be found to
contain more than one subject (the common law
as it stands today).

Here, subjects must be defined so narrowly that
nearly all acts are found to contain multiple subjects
(the specter feared by opponents of the single
subject rule).

The center - where the framers intended for
single subject jurisprudence to reside. Here,
subjects must be defined with reasonable
specificity. Acts enjoy the constitutional
capacity to embrace multiple provisions, so
long as a reasonable and rationale unity exists
among them. Acts containing one or more
provisions that are not reasonably amenable to
a classification of the same subject as the other
provisions will properly be voided by the courts.

The second preliminary issue concerning a new single subject
framework is the notion of judicial activism and its relationship to the
preceding ideas. The framers did not intend that the single subject rule would
be an instrument of judicial oppression—to become, in the words of section
19’s opponents, an evil greater than the evils it was intended to prevent. Yet
it is equally indisputable that the framers intended the rule to be judicially
enforced, and that acts would be voided at whatever frequency offending acts
happened to be promulgated. The framers’ and ratifiers’ intent, and not the
legislature’s convenience, should guide the courts’ jurisprudence.344
Opponents of Indiana’s single subject rule were correct that if the courts were
to deploy section 19 to strike acts on mere technicalities, this would be an
abuse of the judicial station. But in light of the overwhelming evidence of
344. See Embry v. O’Bannon, 798 N.E.2d 157, 160 (Ind. 2003) (quoting City Chapel Evangelical Free
Inc. v. City of S. Bend, 744 N.E.2d 443, 447 (Ind. 2001)) (“[t]he intent of the framers of the
Constitution is paramount in determining the meaning of a provision”); see also Ellingham v. Dye,
99 N.E. 1, 15 (Ind. 1912) (“where the means by which [a legislative] power granted shall be
exercised are specified, no other or different means for the exercise of such power can be implied,
even though considered more convenient or effective than the means given in the Constitution”).
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the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent, the current jurisprudence is also equally an
abdication of the judiciary’s duty.
The framers intended that section 19 would be judicially enforced,345
that an act’s subject would be defined with reasonable specificity,346 and that
a reasonable connection between the provisions of an act would have to be
shown in order to satisfy section 19.347 The common law can deviate from
this centrist position in either of two ways. First, the courts might embrace
the position actually taken in Indiana’s common law, under which acts are
defined so broadly that any two provisions imaginable are characterized as
“one subject.” This plainly defeats the framers’ intent, as they were
combating, among other things, the popular practice of entitling acts very
generally, “to which was added the words, ‘and for other purposes.’”348 If
subjects may be defined as broadly as “contract law” or “juvenile law,” this
is no better than a very narrow and specific title, the end of which reads “and
for other purposes.” Second, the law might embrace the position feared by
section 19’s opponents, which would void acts for mere technicalities or by
defining the subject of an act with unreasonable narrowness.
If we define “judicial activism” as a deviation from the well-defined
intent of the framers, then a substantial movement in either of these
alternative directions is equally a manifestation of activism. The degree of
activism is measured by the legal test’s distance from the framers’ centrist
intent for the single subject rule.349 Graphing the notion of judicial activism
with the reasonableness spectrum results in the following:

345.
346.
347.
348.

See Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 28–29, 34–35).
See supra Part II.A.1.
See supra notes 33 & 40 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., 2 REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA 1086–87 (2009) (see remarks of Mr. Maguire);
see also Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 13 n.76).
349. Although it has been accomplished outside of the context of the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent, some
courts over time have articulated an essentially centrist position with respect to single subject
analysis. See, e.g., State v. Morgan, 48 N.W. 314, 316–17 (S.D. 1891).
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A
B

C

Breadth

Specificity

The Reasonableness Spectrum
(degree of specificity required in
defining subjects)

The parabolic curve defines the possible locations of a state’s single
subject jurisprudence. Its shape is derived from the framers’ intent: that the
single subject rule would be enforced, and that the courts would characterize
acts with neither over-breadth nor extreme narrowness, but instead with
reasonable specificity. Point A describes a jurisprudence in which courts
characterize the subjects of acts very broadly. Point B describes the opposite
jurisprudence: here, subjects are construed very narrowly. Few acts are
found (can be found) in violation of the single subject rule under
jurisprudence A, because “the deck is stacked” very heavily in favor of
finding any two provisions imaginable comprising the same (very broad)
subject. Similarly, in jurisprudence B, the courts would strike laws falling
outside of the evils that section 19 was designed to remedy. Individual cases
decided under either jurisprudence would be found along the tangents of
points A and B, scattered across the dashed lines but clustered primarily
around points A and B. Under jurisprudence A, all but the most demanding
decision will represent some degree of judicial activism. The same is true for
all but the most broadly defined subjects under jurisprudence B.
Point A represents the actual common law in Indiana and in most single
subject states; Point B represents the scenario that the Convention minority
feared. Point C represents the framers’ intent, where subjects are
characterized according to reasonable specificity. The line tangent to Point
C is horizontal and overlays the x-axis. This is a unique place within the
graph: for every point along C’s tangent line, the degree of judicial activism
(its y-axis coordinate) is zero.
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Indiana’s present treatment of the single subject rule is errant in two
respects. First, Indiana’s decisional law adopted the Point A jurisprudence
instead of the Point C jurisprudence.350 But the common law also labors
under the false premise that section 19 jurisprudence is a binary choice
between points A and B, and that position A is justified as the lesser of two
evils. Later rationalizations, including the argument from article III and the
separation of powers,351 were added to justify this view. Yet moving in either
direction away from Point C represents judicial activism. Thus, whether
position A can be found philosophically more palatable than position B is
wholly irrelevant: they are both vastly (and, it would seem, equally) inferior
to position C.
We thus turn to the challenge of defining the subject of an act—that is,
how a court characterizes the subject with “reasonable specificity.” Based
on what we have thus far observed in this article and in our prior work,352 it
follows that:
(1) in characterizing the subject, the characterization must be as specific as
possible while still incorporating or accounting for all provisions, the title,
the apparent legislative intent, and other indicia of the subject; and (2) this
characterization must be reasonably specific, (that is, no more broad than is
necessary to accomplish step (1) above), such that the reasonable
layperson353 can (a) anticipate, to a reasonable degree of accuracy, the likely
contents and import of the act, and (b) not find any individual provision’s
inclusion in the act a surprise354 in light of the manner in which the act’s
subject is characterized (that is, in light of its breadth).

An example will illustrate this new test of reasonable specificity.355 Suppose
that the state legislature passes an act containing the following provisions:
350. From the earliest cases, such as Potts, a “reasonable specificity” standard prevailed in Indiana until
the Civil War era cases began adopting new rules. See supra Part II.
351. See supra Part III.
352. See generally Evans & Bannister, supra note 1.
353. Because it was for the benefit of the average citizen for whom the 1851 Constitution was drafted—
and not for the legislature’s convenience or efficiency—it is appropriate to consider the reactions
of the average reasonable citizen in the section 19 framework. See Evans & Bannister, supra note
1 (manuscript at 4–7) (discussing both (1) the populist sentiment prevailing at the time of, and
motivating the drafting of, the 1851 Constitution, and (2) the goal of eradicating perceived
legislative excesses in the new Constitution).
354. By “surprise,” we mean “not reasonably foreseeable in light of how the subject is defined.” Some
states, even those that embrace a highly deferential single subject standard, recognize this notion.
See, e.g., Jackson v. Gallet, 228 P. 1068, 1070 (Idaho 1924) (“when one, reading a bill with a full
scope of the title thereof in mind, comes upon provisions which he could not reasonably have
anticipated because of their being in no way suggested by the title in any reasonable view of it, they
are not constitutionally covered thereby”) (emphasis added) (quoting Diana Shooting Club v.
Lamoreux, 89 N.W. 880, 883 (Wis. 1902)).
355. At least one state has adopted a similar understanding. In Missouri, the titles of acts (which must
express and define the act’s subject) can violate the “clear title” requirement in two ways. First, a
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(1) it shall be an offense to use the credit card of another without the owner’s
permission; (2) it shall be an offense to take or possess the credit card of
another without the owner’s permission; (3) it shall be an offense to sell the
credit card information of another without their consent; (4) for all of the
foregoing offenses, the penalty upon conviction shall be one year
imprisonment or a $5,000 fine; and (5) the rate of the state’s sales tax is
lowered from 6% to 1%.

The new framework requires that we characterize the subject of this
hypothetical act with “reasonable specificity”—that is to say, as specifically
as possible while still incorporating or accounting for all provisions, the title,
the apparent legislative intent, and other indicia of the subject. In the absence
of the fifth provision, the subject of this act might be characterized as
“protecting the security of credit card ownership.” The fifth provision,
however, renders this characterization impossible, because the effective rate
of sales tax cannot be said to reasonably relate to the security of credit cards.
This would fail our new rule: the average citizen would be surprised to find
the tax rate provision a part of the act in light of how we have characterized
the act’s subject. Significantly, we must note that at some abstract level, if
we are willing to be “broad” enough, the two are related. One could argue
that a lower sales tax rate will encourage greater spending in society, the
preponderance of which is likely to be undertaken with credit cards by virtue
of their convenience; and that the consumer, knowing that there are now
penalties in place for the theft and fraudulent use of credit cards, will be more
inclined to use their cards. But this is precisely the type of maneuver the
framers sought to preclude through the single subject rule. There being no
direct connection between the sales tax rate and credit card fraud, we would
have to salvage our proposed definition of the subject by appending another
phrase to it: “protecting the security of credit card usage, and for other
purposes.”356
As noted, however, this possibility is foreclosed: the single subject
rule’s proponents sought to end the practice of appending “and for other
purposes” to the titles of acts.357 Thus, in an effort to salvage our hypothetical
title can be “attacked on the basis that it is so restrictive and underinclusive that some of the
provisions of the bill fall outside its scope.” Home Builders Ass’n of Greater St. Louis v. State, 75
S.W.3d 267, 270 (Mo. 2002) (citing Mo. State Med. Ass’n. v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 39 S.W.3d 837,
841 (Mo. 2001)). Alternatively, “a title may be unclear because the subject it expresses is so broad
and amorphous in scope that it fails to give notice of its content, which ‘effectively renders the
single subject requirement meaningless or obscures the actual subject of the legislation.’” Home
Builders Ass’n of Greater St. Louis, 75 S.W.3d at 270 (quoting Drury v. City of Cape Girardeau,
66 S.W.3d 733, 739 (Mo. 2002)). This Article arrives at the same conclusion as these Missouri
authorities, but by virtue of the rule’s meaning as it is surmised from the rule’s plain language and
from the intent of the Indiana framers and ratifiers.
356. See supra note 331 and accompanying text.
357. See Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 13 n.76 and accompanying text).
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statute, we are forced to instead redefine its subject more broadly, as
something like, “promoting and encouraging commerce.” But this would fail
the requirement that the reasonable layperson be capable of anticipating, to a
reasonable degree of accuracy, the likely contents and import of the act. Our
“commerce” characterization of the subject does nothing to inform the
average citizen that it contains provisions specifically concerning credit card
security or the rate of sales tax. Thus, under the standard proposed here, our
example statute would invariably (and correctly) be held void by virtue of
embracing more than one subject.
The standard proposed here is more rigorous than that found in Bright,
where the Court defined “reasonably specific” as “indicat[ing] some
particular branch of legislation, as a head under which the particular
provisions of the act might reasonably be looked for.”358 For the reasons we
have seen, the framers did not intend a standard of infinite reasonableness
(like the standard actually applied in Bright).359 Yet, neither is the
“reasonable particularity” standard an invitation to the courts to void acts for
mere technicalities. The phrase “matters properly connected” was offered to
reassure opponents of section 19 that the courts would not void acts for mere
technical defects or by characterizing subjects with extreme narrowness.360
In other words, the “matters properly connected” phrase operates to reject
Jurisprudence B on the graph above; but this does not mean, as the common
law holds, that the “properly connected” phrase mandates Jurisprudence A.
The test proposed here accomplishes what neither of the competing
alternatives can: it implements reasonable specificity.
C. Beginnings of a New Single Subject Framework
1. The Substantive Prong
The first analytical portion demanded by the single subject rule’s
substantive prong—namely, whether the subject of an act has been defined
with reasonable specificity—was discussed above. A second part of the

358. Bright v. McCullough, 27 Ind. 223, 227 (1866).
359. The Bright standard must be rejected for the additional reason that section 19 had nothing to do
with codification or with the act’s location within the statute books. See supra notes 35 & 36 and
accompanying text.
360. See Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript at 20–25). The Indiana Convention majority
rejected the “matters properly connected” phrase for the same reason that its opponents returned it
to the language of section 19 in the closing phase of the Convention. Opponents of section 19 hoped
that the phrase “matters properly connected” would induce future courts to establish a jurisprudence
at Point A in the graph above, instead of at Point C. Experience has borne out the opponents’
strategy. See generally supra Parts II & III.
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analysis remains: the question of whether all provisions of an act are
reasonably related.361
The case of State v. Steinwedel362 discussed the nature of the substantive
prong. Two principal points of law are taken from Steinwedel in the Burns
Indiana Statues Annotated:
The object of the act, the rational basis for the grouping of the subject
matter, and the potential for deceiving the public are points to be considered
in determining whether the matters embraced constitute one subject.363
...
A statute is not invalid as including more than one subject, if there is any
reasonable basis for grouping together in one act various matters of the
same nature, and the public will not be readily deceived thereby. 364

The first of these points is essentially correct.365 The second point, however,
is not. It is this second proposition that led to the current jurisprudence of
infinite reasonableness and absolute deference, rather than one of reasonable
specificity and reasonable connection. It is not sufficient that there be any
basis for grouping disparate provisions together, for “subjects are infinitely
divisible,” and in practice, this standard has proven to mean that any two
provisions that the legislature includes in the same act will inevitably be
found to have, at some level, a “reasonable connection.”366
Consider again our previous example (this time, for simplicity’s sake,
omitting the renegade fifth provision on sales tax): (1) it shall be an offense
to use the credit card of another without the owner’s permission; (2) it shall
be an offense to take or possess the credit card of another without the owner’s
permission; (3) it shall be an offense to sell the credit card information of
another without their consent; and (4) for all of the foregoing offenses, the
penalty upon conviction shall be one year imprisonment or a $5,000 fine.
This act might inspire numerous characterizations of its subject, including:

361. Even states that have very lax standards for the enforcement of the single subject rule have adopted
this view. See, e.g., Migdal v. State, 747 A.2d 1225, 1230 (Md. 2000) (“The key to evaluating a
particular piece of legislation under [Maryland’s single subject rule] appears to be the germaneness
of the individual components of the law as passed.”).
362. 180 N.E. 865 (Ind. 1932). See also supra notes 83–91 and accompanying text.
363. IND. CONST. art. IV, § 19, at 396.
364. Id.
365. See generally Evans & Bannister, supra note 1.
366. For the same reason, Steinwedel was also incorrect when it held that “the unity” between provisions
is “found in the general purpose of the act and the practical problems of efficient administration.”
Id. Section 19 was not designed for the legislature’s convenience; yet under the Steinwedel rule,
any two provisions that the legislature finds convenient to treat as one subject are to be considered
one subject. This begs the very legal question at issue and undermines the intent of the framers.
See also GEORGE A. MILLER, THE SCIENCE OF WORDS 173, 176–78 (1991) (noting that “[t]hings
that have names usually have many names,” and discussing lexical hierarchies).
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Matters of public policy upon which the legislature
wishes to legislate

Encouraging commerce

Encouraging commerce by reassuring credit card users of the
security of their card usage

Protecting the security of credit card usage

Protecting the security of credit card usage by providing
penalties for credit card theft, conversion or the sale of information

Most
specific

Protecting the security of credit card usage in Indiana and
thereby to encourage commerce and the use of credit card
payments in commerce by criminalizing the use of the credit card
of another without the owner's permission, the taking or other
appropriation of the credit card of another without permission,
and the sale of the credit card information of another, and to
provide for the penalties for any such conduct, which penalties
shall be, upon conviction, the one year of imprisonment
or a fine of $5,000.

Now, if the Steinwedel approach is at work—if this law will be found
to comply with the single subject rule upon a showing that there is any
“reasonable” basis for grouping these provisions together—then even the
most general of the characterizations above will be acceptable. All of our
hypothetical act’s provisions are indeed “matters of public policy upon which
the legislature wishes to legislate.” The same is true for the next broadest
possibilities of “promoting the public welfare” and “encouraging
commerce.” Significantly, however, these would also be “accurate”
descriptions of the subject had we included the fifth provision (concerning
the rate of sales tax) in the act. And indeed, the same would be true for any
two provisions imaginable, which might be grouped together in a single act.
The Steinwedel standard invariably permits provisions which are truly
unrelated (or, equally as bad, which relate only at the most abstract and
general of levels) to be included under the same “subject.” This is manifestly
contrary to the framers’ goal of ensuring reasonably related provisions.367

367. See generally Evans & Bannister, supra note 1; see also supra notes 31 & 32 and accompanying
text.
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A better test—one commensurate with the framers’ intent—would seek
to evaluate whether a unifying thread, or an essential nexus, is shared
amongst all of the act’s provisions, from the perspective of those responsible
for its passage.368 A better test for evaluating whether all of the provisions
are reasonably related would be the following question:
Would the legislator whose only concern in the world is the passage of the
act at issue (the subject of which has been defined through the steps above)
reasonably care about, or support, the provision allegedly falling outside of
the subject, but for its inclusion in the same act?369

In other words, we must look for “outlier” provisions within an act—
provisions that lack a unifying thread, or the essential nexus, that at least
some of the other provisions share, as well as the degree to which they share
their common thread.
It follows that, under the framework proposed here, claims arising out
of the single subject rule’s substantive prong are questions of law.

368. We assume the legislator’s perspective on this portion of the single subject test because its
fundamental purpose is to preclude legislative logrolling. 2 REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF
INDIANA 1085 (2009). The prohibition against logrolling forbids the combination of unrelated
provisions under one heading. Hence, we ask whether a legislator who introduced a bill purportedly
on the single subject X would or could reasonably care about provision Y, if the subject X was the
only matter about which the legislator cared. This perspective finds support in at least some of the
single subject states, even where similar rules were propagated without reference to the intent of
the state’s framers and ratifiers. In Colorado, for instance, the Supreme Court has noted that
[t]he matter covered by legislation is to be ‘clearly,’ not ‘dubiously’ or ‘obscurely,’
indicated by the title. Its relation to the subject must not rest upon a merely possible or
doubtful inference. The connection must be so obvious as that ingenious reasoning,
aided by superior rhetoric will not be necessary to reveal it. Such connection should be
within the comprehension of the ordinary intellect, as well as the trained legal mind.
Sullivan v. Siegal, 245 P.2d 860, 863–64 (Colo. 1952) (emphasis added). Although the Sullivan
Court was assessing the title requirement as it relates to the single subject rule, the point is welltaken in either context: the subject of an act as expressed in its title must be so clearly connected
that even non-lawyers can easily comprehend what the subject is. As we argue in Part V, infra, this
reasoning extends to individual provisions within the act: in light of how the act’s subject is defined,
every provision contained within the act must be unsurprising, and must bear a clear and obvious
connection to that subject, even in the mind of a non-lawyer member of the state legislature.
369. This is reminiscent of Oklahoma’s position, where the “question [for single subject claims] is not
how similar two provisions in a proposed law are, but whether it appears that the proposal is
misleading or that the provisions in the proposal are so unrelated that those voting on the law would
be faced with an all-or-nothing choice.” Douglas v. Cox Ret. Props., Inc., 302 P.3d 789, 792–93
(Okla. 2013) (emphasis added).
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2. The Procedural Prong
Once it is liberated from the enrolled act rule,370 the analytical
framework for the single subject rule’s procedural prong can be articulated
in a straight-forward manner. Whether or not logrolling actually occurred is
a question of fact, and as such, evidence tending to prove or disprove the
presence of logrolling (including the House and Senate journals) should be
admissible pursuant to the Rules of Evidence.371
The framers understood logrolling much as we do today. For the
framers, logrolling occurred “[w]hen a bill is presented and its friends are not
numerous enough to pass it, and they enter into a coalition with [other
legislators] who desire the passage of some other measure to mutually assist
each other in the passage of both combined under one head.”372 Any
evidence relevant to the occurrence of such a “coalition” or “combination”
should be admissible with respect to section 19’s procedural prong. Evidence
that the act in question began its existence as multiple, different acts therefore
presents a prima facie case of logrolling. This presumption can be rebutted
by a showing that the constituent provisions (the previously separate bills)
fall under the same subject (as determined by the previous steps in this new
framework).373
Empirical evidence of logrolling may not be available in a given case.
This alone would not defeat a section 19 challenge, for the act in question
must also be shown to contain only one subject—an issue, we have said, that
is solely a question of law.

370. See supra Part III.B.
371. In Indiana, for example, these are Evidence Rules 401 and 402, which define “relevant evidence”
and provide that all” relevant evidence is admissible . . . .” IND. R. EVID. 402.
372. 2 REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA 1085. Logrolling was understood to occur when bills
were “[tacked] upon other bills.” Id. at 2010; see also Evans & Bannister, supra note 1 (manuscript
at 30 n.169 and accompanying text).
373. Evidence that bills were combined prior to passage “raises a flag” that may be indicative of the
behavior that the framers and ratifiers sought to eliminate through the single subject rule, but not
all combinations of bills are indicative of logrolling. Bills that concern the same subject might
legitimately be combined as a matter of the legislature’s time management or procedural simplicity,
or to create a better law substantively. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dix v. Celeste, 464 N.E.2d 153, 157
(Ohio 1984) (noting that the combining of bills “may not be for purposes of logrolling but for the
purposes of bringing greater order and cohesion to the law or of coordinating an improvement of
the law’s substance” and that “when there is an absence of common purpose or relationship between
specific topics in an act and when there are no discernible practical, rational or legitimate reasons
for combining the provisions in one act, there is a strong suggestion that the provisions were
combined for tactical reasons, i.e., logrolling”). Although this paper disagrees with the bulk of
Dix’s treatment of the single subject rule (see generally supra Parts II-V and note 30 (discussing
Ohio’s approach to the single subject rule)), we agree with Dix’s assessment of this particular point.
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3. Summary: A Reasonable Reasonableness Test
To summarize, this article’s framework proposes the following
analytical process:

Single Subject Rule Analysis
under the new framework
(1) Define the subject of the act in question with reasonable specificity - that is, with as
much specificity as is possible while still accounting for all provisions of the act, as
well as any other indicia of the subject. (Substantive prong; question of law)

If yes, return to Step 2 and
rewrite the subject's
characterization until the
subject is broad enough that
its contents would not come
as a surprise to the average
citizen

Then proceed to Step 2

These go to the
question, "is the
subject defined
with reasonable
specificity?"

(2) Armed with the proposed characterization of the act's subject, would the average
citizen, upon reading the contents of the act, be surprised at the inclusion of any single
provision in light of how the subject has been defined? Otherwise stated, in light of
the subject's characterization, do one or more provisions of the act represent
outliers, not sufficiency connected to the mass of other provisions? Does any one or
more provisions lack a unifying thread, or the essential nexus, of the bulk of the
other provisions? (Substantive prong; question of law)
If no, then proceed to Step 3
(3) Is the subject now defined so broadly that the average citizen would be unable to
anticipate, with a reasonable degree of accuracy, the likely contents and import
of the act, having not read its particular provisions? (Substantive prong; question
of law)

This question goes
to the question of,
"are all provisions
reasonably related?"
(That is to say, given
our characterization
of the subject, are
all provisions part of
or members of that
subject?)

If yes

The whole act is
unconstitutional

If no

The whole act is
unconstitutional

If no, then proceed to Step 4
(4) Would the legislator whose only concern in the world is the passage of the subject
(as defined) reasonably care about and/or reasonably support the provision(s)
alleged to be outside of the subject, but for their inclusion in the same act?
(Substantive prong; question of law)
If yes, then proceed to Step 5
(5) Was the act passed through logrolling?
(Procedural prong; question of fact)
If no, then
The whole act is
constitutional

If yes, then

The whole act is
unconstitutional
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4. Examples from History
It may be useful to apply the new framework to actual cases from
history. The first, to illustrate an acceptable combination of provisions,
comes from an example at Indiana’s 1850 Convention. One delegate
opposed to the single subject rule worried that the following act would be
void under section 19:
[An act] which shall provide that when, hereafter, any person shall agree,
in the body of a promissory note or bill of exchange that he will pay the
same without any relief from valuation or appraisement laws, and that upon
judgment being rendered on such note or bill, the court shall award
execution to be levied with such relief, and that upon execution issued on
such judgment, the sheriff or other officer shall make sale of property,
without any valuation or appraisement. 374

This delegate asserted that,
[T]here are three distinct subjects which may be all embraced in one
section—first in relation to the execution of the contract, secondly, in
relation to the judgment of the court upon that contract, and thirdly, with
regard to the duty of the officer in executing the judgment. 375

The delegate incorrectly surmised that section 19 would provide a basis for
voiding such a law. Following the steps of our new framework, we first
define the subject of this act with reasonable specificity, which might be “an
act recognizing the right of parties to a contract to forego the legal protections
otherwise supplied by the State’s valuation and appraisement laws, and
providing for the consequences when such a contract is breached.” Upon
reading the contents of the act, the average citizen would not be surprised by
any of its provisions, given the manner in which the subject was
characterized. In our third step, we find that the average citizen would indeed
be able to anticipate, with a reasonable degree of certainty, the likely contents
and import of the act. The fourth step is also clear. If a legislator whose only
care in the world was “the passage of an act to legalize contracts which forego
the protection of the State’s valuation and appraisement laws” were to read
the contents of this act, he or she would reasonably care about each and every
one of the three provisions in the act. None of the three provisions is an
outlier; they all can be said to reasonably share the common nexus of crafting
a public policy concerning the legalization of such contracts. There is a
374. 2 REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA 1086–87 (2009).
375. Id.
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reasonable relation between all of the act’s provisions. Our hypothetical
legislator would care about each provision here because there is a linear
progression between them: there is no disjointedness, and each provision
reasonably relates to the subject of such contracts to the same degree.
Contrast the example above with the statute sanctioned in the 1935 case
of Ule v. State.376 In Ule, the purported subject of the act, proclaimed in its
title, was:
AN ACT providing for the registration and licensing of motor vehicles,
motor bicycles, tractors, trailers and semi-trailers, for the regulation of the
use and operation thereof on the public highways, defining chauffeurs and
providing for the examination and licensing thereof, the suspension and
revocation of licenses, and the transfer of ownership, requiring the keeping
of certain records of motor vehicles, motor bicycles and motor trucks for
which storage, supplies or repairs are furnished, providing that liens may be
taken thereon, and prescribing penalties for the violation thereof.377

The party challenging the act claimed that it embraced two subjects: “the
regulation of motor vehicles upon the public highways and [the] granting [of]
liens to persons in certain cases.”378 The Ule Court concluded that the act
complied with Section 19 because the actual subject was “motor vehicles.”379
Under our new framework, this statute is impermissible. The Ule
statute encounters problems in steps two, three and four of the new
framework. For example, characterizing the subject as “motor vehicles”
would not enable the average citizen to anticipate, with a reasonable degree
of accuracy, the fact that this act contains provisions touching upon the
licensing of chauffeurs, the keeping of records related to motor bikes, and
liens upon vehicles. A subject such as “motor vehicles” is not reasonably
specific. Even if this was not the case, the reasonable legislator whose only
care in the world was to regulate the licensure of chauffeurs could not
reasonably care about or support a provision speaking to the keeping of
certain records pertaining to “motor trucks for which storage, supplies or
repairs are furnished,” but for its inclusion in the same act. There is no
inherent or reasonable nexus between these provisions; they cannot be said
to share a linear progression toward some coherent policy, unless and except
if the subject is defined unreasonably broadly. If we were to take the
relatively detailed title of the act as its subject, the same difficulty is
encountered, as the title itself contains multiple subject.

376.
377.
378.
379.

194 N.E. 140 (Ind. 1935).
Id. at 143.
Id.
Id. at 144.
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VI. CONCLUSION: REANIMATING THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE
The state constitutional mandate known as the “single subject rule”
merits enforcement. The framers intended that the courts would enforce this
vital provision through a centrist standard of reasonableness. In Indiana, the
common law’s existing roadblocks to enforcement are unjustified as a matter
of both the framers’ intent for section 19 as well as by virtue of the misguided
reasoning upon which these roadblocks rely. Additionally, the single subject
rule has, to varying degrees, been under-enforced throughout most of the
single subject states. If the robust historical record surrounding the intent of
Indiana’s framers and ratifiers is any guide (and it should be, for most states’
records speak little to their framers’ and ratifiers’ intentions for the rule), then
the new single subject framework proposed here would likely contribute
productively across the states as they move to reanimate their single subject
rules.

